Banco Invest consulting project credit risk by Engels, Victoria et al.
A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Master Degree in 











Filippo Sandri – 27193 
Victoria Engels – 27253 
Pedro David Ramos Rodrigues – 21929 
Rosa Maria Ferreira Figueiredo – 27243 





A Project carried out within the Master in Finance Program, under the supervision of: 










01st of January 2018 
 
 - 1 - 
Table of Contents  
List of Abbreviations ……………………………………………………………….   2 
Introduction …………………………………………………………………………   3 
I – Banco Invest’s Internal Credit Rating Model …………………………………..   6 
  I.1. Outlook on Opportunities for Extensions & Adjustments ………………… 10 
II – Division into Sectors and Sub-industries ……………………………………... 12 
II.1. Definition and Characteristics of Sectors ………………………………… 13 
II.2. Conglomerate Companies ………………………………………………... 20 
III – Proposal for Adjusted Credit Risk Model ……………………………………  21  
       III.1 Model composition ………………………………………………………. 22 
       III.2 Scale Factor ………………………………………………………………  22 
       III.3 Business Profile …………….……………………………………………. 27 
       III.4 Financial Profile ………………………………………………………….  36 
       III.5 Financial Policy ………………………………………………………….  41 
IV – Implications of Sector Characteristics on Model Variables ………………….  51 
        IV.1 Services and Branded Products Sector ………………………………….  52 
        IV.2 Capital or Asset-Intensive Industries Sector ……………………………. 59 
        IV.3 Pure Commodity Industries Sector ……………………………………… 66 
        IV.4 National Industries and Utilities Sector ………………………………… 72 
V – Model Test for Active & Defaulted Companies ………………………………  77 
       V.1 Test Outcomes ……………………………………………………………  79 
VI – Probability of Default Assessment …………………………………………..  84 
        VI.1 Altman’s Z-score ……………………………………………………….  85 
        VI.2 Logit Model ……………………………………………………………..  88 
        VI.3 Comparison of Results for Test Sample ………………………………..  102 
 - 2 - 
VII – Conclusion …………………………………………………………………..  105 
VIII – Appendix ……………………………………………………………………. 107 
IX – References …………………………………………………………………….. 131 
 
 
List of Abbreviations 
S.A.  Sociedade anónima 
SGPS  Sociedade gestora de participações sociais 
S&P  Standard & Poor’s 
CPGP  Competitive Position Group Profile 
EBITDA  Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization 
FFO  Funds from operations 
RCF  Retained cash flow 
FCF  Free cash flow 
CFO  Cash flow from operations 
COGS  Cost of goods sold 
Capex  Capital expenditures 
CCC  Cash conversion cycle 
CAI   Capital and asset-intensive  
SBP  Services and branded products 
NI&U  National industries and utilities 
PD  Probability of default 
CRA  Credit Rating Agency 
e.g.  for example 
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Introduction 
The topic of our master thesis work project is the field lab centring around credit risk in 
cooperation with Banco Invest. Banco Invest is a Lisbon-based investment bank which offers 
corporate finance solutions in the areas of mergers, acquisitions and restructuring and operates 
in the fields of asset management, brokerage and property leasing. It was founded in 1997 as 
Banco Alves Ribeiro S.A. and was renamed Banco Invest in 2005. It is a subsidiary of Alves 
Ribeiro Investimentos Financeiros, SGPS S.A.  
The main goal of our field lab project was to develop a credit scoring model for large and 
medium-sized corporate clients of Banco Invest as well as to improve the current rating system 
and add methodologies which allow for measuring probabilities of default.  
Our work project builds upon two pillars: first of all, we analyse the credit risk tool of Banco 
Invest, critically discuss its benefits and shortfalls and subsequently present our own rating 
model. Secondly, we turn to academic research on the assessment of probabilities of default 
and apply two models, namely the Altman Z-score model and a logit regression model to the 
Banco Invest company portfolio. We compare the scores obtained through application of the 
two approaches and close the analysis by drawing conclusions from the outcomes we obtain.  
In addition to this report, we have created an Excel tool which is based on our credit model and 
able to return a credit score, Z-score and probability of default for every company of the Banco 
Invest set. We did so in order to provide the Bank with a solution that it could possibly apply 
in its daily business routine and to comply with the practical, consultancy-style approach of our 
work project. 
Before evolving with the analysis of the two pillars previously mentioned, we would first like 
to start by giving a brief, general outline on the topic of credit risk. 
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One of the most crucial considerations in finance is the relationship between risk and return. 
Any investment that yields a rate of return beyond the risk-free rate will embody a certain type 
and degree of risk which an investor consequently gets compensated for.  
While for equities, risk is of systematic nature and consists in possible movements of the overall 
market which trigger price declines on the single-stock level, risk in fixed income markets 
comes in different notions. Investors putting their money in loan or bond securities face e.g. 
interest rate risk meaning that their portfolio’s value will fluctuate according to the term 
structure of interest rates. Moreover, they encounter inflation risk since inflation will dilute the 
return they earn on their investments in real terms. Ultimately, and most decisively for our 
master thesis project, fixed income investors are confronted with credit risk which raises to the 
potential that a debtor is not able to fulfil his debt payments as stated in the contractual 
documents of the security.  
Hence, knowledge about and proper assessment of credit risk appears to be crucial for an 
investor to efficiently allocate the funds he has at hand. This is essentially where credit ratings 
come into play. Credit ratings pose an analysis of the solvency of a debtor who can be an 
individual, a corporation, an institution or a state issuing a debt security. Credit ratings represent 
a tool that facilitates decision-making to investors of which debtor to concede credit to and 
implicitly reveal an assessment of the debtor’s likelihood to default. On the debtor side, credit 
ratings determine the spread to be paid for loans and bonds and hence form an essential part of 
the overall cost of capital. Credit ratings thus are crucial for debt markets since they facilitate 
the matching of supply and demand for funds by allowing for a better valuation of the risk-
return profile of each investment. 
While there are three big rating agencies - Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch - who publish 
ratings on major corporates, institutions and states, investors (particularly banks) may run their 
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own internal credit rating analysis tools to evaluate debtors that are not covered by agencies. 
Banco Invest’s credit risk model falls under this category.   
During the course of our thesis project, we recognized that credit risk analysis is neither solely 
science nor art but rather a conjunction of both. It entails financial, accounting and statistical 
elements but it is also influenced by subjectivity in the assumptions drawn. It spans multiple 
dimensions ranging from macroeconomic considerations to in-depth analyses of the financial 
statements of a company. Eventually, the challenge is then to convert all the information one 
obtains into a comprehensive model comprising metrics that are well measurable and 
comparable between firms, a matter which we will try to accomplish in the following course of 
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I 
Banco Invest Internal Credit Rating Model 
Before unfolding with our own suggestion for a possible credit rating model, we would first 
like to give an overview of the internal credit risk tool that the bank is currently using. 
 
Banco Invest Rating Model 
   
Rating Factors Sub-Factors Weighting 
Scale   5% 
 Revenues 5% 
   
Business Profile  35% 
 Market Characteristics 5% 
 Expected Growth 5% 
 Competitive Profile 5% 
 Technology Position 5% 
 Geographic Diversification 5% 
 Exogenous Factors 5% 
 Market Share 5% 
   
Financial Profile  45% 
 Net Debt / EBITDA 15% 
 EBITDA / Interest Expense 15% 
 RCF / Net Debt 10% 
 (FFO - Capex) / Debt 5% 
 
  
Financial Policy   15% 
 Shareholders 5% 
 Governance 5% 
 Financial Policy 5% 
  
Banco Invest’s model contains of four different factors, two being of quantitative and two of 
qualitative nature. Namely, there are the factors of “Scale”, “Business Profile”, “Solvency and 
Financial Coverage” and “Financial Policy”. Three of the four sectors are further on divided 
into sub-factors, only “Scale” is a stand-alone category. Each (sub-)factor gets assigned a 
weight according to which its respective rating will influence the overall company rating. The 
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company rating itself is then the weighted average of all the individual, factor-based ratings. 
The ratings themselves are assigned through a specific scoring table per sub-factor.  
According to Banco Invest’s definition, the “Scale”-factor should depict “the general access to 
resources and improvements due to internal organization as well as cost advantages that are 
linked to economies of scale. The larger the enterprise in terms of NPV, the larger its ability to 
capture this advantage”. More concretely, “Scale” rates the volume of revenue a company can 
generate in absolute terms (Appendix 1). On a 10-step scale, it assigns an Aaa rating for 
companies with more than €3.000 million in revenue going down to a default rating for 
companies with less than €50 million in revenue. “Scale” has a weight of 5% in the overall 
rating calculation.  
The second quantitative factor, “Solvency and Financial Coverage” captures different financial 
ratios, all being indicative of the entity’s ability to carry out its debt payments in due time. In 
more detail, Banco Invest applies the following four ratios: 
● Net Debt / EBITDA (leverage ratio) 
● EBITDA / Interest payable (coverage ratio) 
● Retained Cash Flow / Net Debt (cash flow coverage ratio) 
● (FFO - Capex) / Debt (cash flow coverage ratio) 
 
Here again, Banco Invest assigns a rating to each one of the four sub-factors in relation to the 
level of the ratios obtained (Appendix 2). “Solvency and Financial Coverage” counts with a 
weight of 45% in the computation of the holistic company credit rating, of which 15% are 
allocated to the first and second ratio, 10% to the third ratio and 5% to the fourth ratio.  
Moving towards to the qualitative factors of Banco Invest tool, we have to contemplate 
“Business Profile” and “Financial Policy”.  
“Business Profile” is subdivided into seven different sub-factors, which match to the following 
definitions by Banco Invest: 
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● Market demand characteristics: “Characterizes the impact of global demand 
characteristics in the markets the company deals in. A company operating in a 
structurally declining market will face more difficulties in maintaining its cash-flow 
generating capacity on the long-run, even if it is the best in its sector”.  
● Company growth potential: “Assesses the company's growth profile in its various P/S, 
considering that a fast-growing company will present better conditions for timely 
repayment of its debt”.  
● Competitive Profile: “Analyses whether a company is dependent 1) on only one 
business segment or 2) on the negotiating power of customers. The more diversified a 
company's product offering and client base, the greater its resistance to cycles of 
economic contraction”.  
● Technological Positioning: “Technological evolution affects all sectors and economic 
activities. Hence, the business model of the company is assessed assuming that it is 
subject to this technological change. Faster technological evolution within the sector in 
which the company is operating also normally requires higher investments which may 
affect the company's ability of debt repayment and shareholder remuneration”. 
● Geographic and business diversification: “Geographic diversification across unrelated 
markets tends to improve the company's competitive position given its stabilizing effect 
amid different business cycles. However, diversification into emerging markets (usually 
more profitable but also more volatile and extreme) may affect the rating negatively if 
it requires significant investments or increases the risk associated with the company 
itself”.  
● Competition: “Assesses the aggressiveness of the market the company is acting within 
and the risk of market share for competing companies. A more competitive market tends 
to have smaller margins and hence less capacity to generate cash flows. On the other 
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hand, a less competitive market is more predictable and usually favours credit risk in 
the short/medium term”.  
● Exogenous Factors: “Government regulation and interference affect ratings given their 
ability to limit or support the company's ability to generate operating cash flows, as 
well as its predictability”.  
“Business Profile” impacts the overall credit rating with a 35% weight being split equally across 
the seven sub-factors (i.e. each sub-factor rating weighs 5% in the overall rating assessment). 
The scales, according to which ratings are allocated, are also of qualitative, explanatory nature 
and reflect a gradual improvement/deterioration in credit risk exposure that the specific sub-
factor under consideration might cause for the company (Appendix 3).  
The fourth factor in Banco Invest’s model is the so-called “Financial Policy”-factor. It is split 
into: 
● Shareholders: “Measures the financial capacity and involvement of shareholders in 
case the company requires financial support. Shareholders with good financial capacity 
tend not to let the company default (unless the business proves to be operationally 
unfeasible)”.  
● Governance: “Evaluates the transparency and separation of powers within the 
company. A company with independent and mutually controlling structures and 
responsibilities tends to be better prepared to avoid conflicts of interest that can benefit 
insiders over outsiders (creditors)”.  
● Financial Policy: “Management's attitude towards financial risk is a good indicator of 
credit risk itself, since a more conservative company will, by nature, tend to avoid 
negative surprises and react more favourably to creditors in case of negative events”. 
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Just as with the other factors, Banco Invest elaborates a 10-step scale and assigns a rating to 
each sub-factor according to qualitative characteristics specified in the scale. The overall weight 
of this factor is 15% being distributed equally among the three sub-factors (Appendix 4). 
The rating attribution is carried out by the risk rating committee of the Bank. It is to be revised 
every 12 months, with the possibility of early modification in case there is evidence that the 
credit risk exposure of a company has changed significantly in the meantime. In case the 
company rating is not renewed on time, it has to be marked as expired in the respective 
documents.  The ultimate rating score for each company is found by extensive analysis on 
behalf of the credit risk department on the one hand and by intense discussions with the credit 
risk committee and company related stakeholders on the other hand.  
 
I.1. Outlook on Opportunities for Extensions & Adjustments 
Looking in detail into the Banco Invest model as well as into the methodologies applied by the 
three main Credit Rating Agencies has given us the insights necessary to formulate a suggestion 
for possible extensions and adjustments of the model. 
We decided to maintain the core structure of Banco Invest’s model (four main factors as 
described in the previous section) as we feel that it accounts for all of the relevant perspectives 
credit risk has to be evaluated against. We saw this stance confirmed by the matter that the 
model orientates itself on Moody’s approach, which is a market-wide accepted issuer of credit 
risk ratings. Nevertheless, we identified several aspects which appeared to have potential for 
modification and extension. 
First of all, we decided to elaborate on the “Scale” factor. We consider it critical that “Scale” 
in the Banco Invest model is assigning a rating based on an assessment of the absolute amount 
of sales a company generates at one certain point in time. 
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Apart from that, we see potential for improvement with some of the qualitative sub-factors in 
the “Business Profile” and “Financial Policy” factor. Points of criticism on the Banco Invest 
model would be a certain imprecision in their formulation, a lack of clearness in their 
delimitation from one another and a mismatch between factor description and corresponding 
rating scale.  
For the “Financial Profile” factor, we clearly missed a profitability ratio which we think is 
substantial for completeness of default risk analysis.  
A further point of doubt attached to Banco Invest’s model is the fact that it does not differentiate 
between industries. We acknowledge the fact that a credit rating model must fulfil the 
requirement of being easily implementable and that distinguishing between different industries 
does indeed add some level of complexity. Nevertheless, we consider credit risk analysis to be 
a sensitive issue which justifies all complexity necessary to derive to a precise assessment. We 
hence decided to introduce a system of how to divide the company set into different macro-
sectors and adherent sub-industries. We also adjust the factor weights according to their 
industry-specific impact on credit risk exposure. Before, they were mostly fixed at a 5%-rate 
across the majority of sub-factors which we consider to be too standardized and probably prone 
to imprecision.  
In addition to the aspects previously mentioned, we extend Banco Invest’s model by by the 
introduction of probability of default measures. More concretely, we calculate Altman’s Z-
score, a credit scoring model suitable for assessing the credit risk of public as well as private 
corporations. Furthermore, we directly estimate the probability of default through a logit 
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SWOT Analysis for Banco Invest Rating Tool 
 
Strength 
• based on methodology of well-
established rating agency Moody’s 
• four main factors appear to build a 
solid framework for analysis 
• procedure of working through different 
factors and subsequently allocating a 
rating by means of scorecard tables 




• static assessment of ”Scale” factor 
• a few imprecisions in the definition of 
sub-factors in the “Business Profile” part 
of the model 
• rather subjective and hardly scalable 
assessment of ”Financial Policy” factor 
• lack of differentiation across industries 
• standardized weight allocation for most 
sub-factors 
• lack of probability of default measure 
 
Opportunities 
• core model structure is easy to be built 
upon and helpful as outline for extensions 
and adjustments 
• modifications shall lead to enhanced 
precision of final rating scores 
• adoption of old features shall foster 
acceptance and practicability of new 
model 
Threats 
• extensions and adjustments of the model 
will lead to a higher degree of complexity 
in the assessment process 
• new model is still infused by a lot of 
subjective assumptions which leave space 






Division into sectors and sub-industries 
 
As previously mentioned, Banco Invest specifies one model that is applicable to the entire set 
of companies. However, different sectors might be affected in different ways by different credit 
risk drivers. Every industry has its own characteristics which translate differently into a specific 
credit rating. What poses a risk to one industry might not be worth concerns for another one 
and vice versa. Certain ratio readings might be elevated for one industry while they prove to be 
too low for another industry.  
Hence, we suggest splitting up Banco Invest’s group of 34 companies into subcategories 
defining clearly their industry and sector positioning.  
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The trade-off we encountered in pursuing this approach is the one of precision versus 
simplicity/implementability. Hence, our suggestion for a subdivision of companies aims to be 
as generic as possible and therefore easily applicable to new companies entering the analysis 
while still depicting precisely the specific characteristics and exposures to credit risk.  
Guidance for our model is provided by Standard & Poor’s Competitive Position Group Profile 
(CPGP) approach. First of all, we adopt S&P’s breakdown into four different sectors, which 
are: 
1. Services and branded products industries  
2. Capital and asset-intensive industries  
3. Pure commodity industries  
4. National industries & utilities 
In the appendix of the thesis report, we present an overview of Standard & Poor’s CPGP 
industry breakdown for the aforementioned four sectors hence allowing for an accurate 
allocation of each company at hand (Appendix 5). Moreover, we provide a table with the sector 
allocations for each of Banco Invest’s portfolio companies (Appendix 6).  
 
II.1. Definition and characteristics of sectors 
After having formally introduced the idea of an industry breakdown, we would now like to turn 
to a description of the characteristics for each single industry sector. Only with a clear profile 
of each sector in mind will we be able to later on determine the variables and the extent to which 
they drive credit risk in the respective sector.   
 
1. Services and Branded Products industries 
According to Standard & Poor’s CPGP, the services and branded products sector is defined as: 
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“Brands, product quality or technology, and service reputation are typically key 
differentiating factors for competing in the industry. Capital intensity is typically low to 
moderate, although supporting the brand often requires ongoing investment in the asset 
base.”  
Typically, these are companies in consumer-facing light manufacturing or service industries. 
Examples include software companies, tourism and personal care. 
A decisive characteristic of the services and branded products industry is its labour-intensity. 
Labour-intensive means that a corporation counts with a high amount of labour cost relative to 
its capital spending on assets that enable production and manufacturing processes. Here, 
manpower as a production input is key for business success. For services, this characteristic is 
even reinforced as labour input heavily outweighs any other capital input in this sector.  
However, along these lines also appear the first issues: the services and branded products 
industry heavily relies on the availability of a skilled workforce that complies with the industry’s 
requirements on abilities and knowledge. If there is no adequate personnel available, companies 
either need to spend significantly on remuneration, change the location of business or adjust 
their product and service offerings.  
Moreover, the current shift from manpowered to machine-run business processes in the context 
of industry 4.0 poses a challenge for companies of the services and branded products industry. 
While they used to be labour-intensive a small while ago, current technological change forces 
many firms to become essentially capital and asset-intensive as it forces firms to replace 
workforce by machines. Being of ethically controversial nature, companies in fact pursue this 
way as it is indispensable once they want to keep up with productivity levels of the industry 
sector.  
But labour-intensity does not only pose challenges. A benefit is that labour cost are 
contemplated as variable expenses whereas capital costs are rather considered to be fixed. 
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Hence, labour-intensive firms have the chance to adjust their spending in times of economic 
contraction by limiting their personnel base. 
An additional characteristic of the services and branded products sector worth looking at is its 
positioning in the distribution channel. Companies in this sector receive their production inputs 
from suppliers and, even more importantly, directly deal with end-consumers. This has crucial 
implications for their business models and activities they need to pursue: building up a certain 
brand recognition and reputation will help them to obtain competitive advantage over 
competitors and brand loyalty amongst customers. Patents and licenses on proprietary products 
will create entry barriers for other firms and hence assure market share. Moreover, innovation 
is key to continuously meet and exceed customer expectations and hence create an urge for the 
company’s products. Main considerations in this context should be of how to respond to shifting 
demographics, digitalization, a growing middle-class in emerging market countries as well as a 
rising awareness for health and environmental issues in developed countries.  
The profitability of services and branded-products firms will be significantly determined by its 
ability to pass on fluctuations in input prices from suppliers on to end-consumers.  
Cyclicality affects in particular those companies positioning themselves in the upper-end 
segment where price-elasticity is high. Producers of more “commoditized” goods will be less 
susceptible to the overall state of the economy.  
 
2. Capital and asset-intensive industries 
Moving on to the next sector, S&P’s CPGP defines capital and asset-intensive industries as 
follows: 
“Sizeable capital investments are generally required to sustain market position in the 
industry. Brand identification is of limited importance, although product and service quality 
often remain differentiating factors. “ 
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Heavy manufacturing and highly automated industries typically fall into this category. 
Examples include airlines, telecommunications, chemical plants or the aerospace & defence 
industry. 
In general, capital and asset intensive industries are characterized by large financial 
commitments to fund operations. Once upfront investments are made, there may be economies 
of scale with regards to ongoing expenses and sales growth, but the initial hurdle to get into the 
business tends to keep the list of competitors small, creating high barriers to entry.  
One can easily detect a firm of the capital and asset intensive sector by looking at the asset 
structure of the balance sheet. As a rule of thumb, the property, plant and equipment-account 
may make up well above 50% of the total asset base. Depreciation amounts are high accordingly 
and re-investment to retain the asset base is substantial. Companies can however modify their 
level of capital intensity by selling some of their capital assets off and entering into lease 
agreements instead. This measure is especially to be taken on in times of financial distress and 
provides the company with a certain flexibility.  
Another good indicator to find out whether a company belongs to the capital and asset intensive 
sector is the relation of capital required to labour required which will by far overweight the first 
factor. Capital-intensive firms usually have elevated leverage ratios, but much of the debt is 
backed by property, plant and equipment which serve as collateral.  
The credit risk attached to a company acting in the capital and asset intensive sector will be 
notably determined by its ability to convert revenue growth into earnings growth which is 
directly related to the proportion of variable to fixed cost (so-called operating leverage). If a 
company is not able to cut down variable cost, it will encounter difficulties in offsetting the 
large amount of investment it has to make in order to start production and to maintain the asset 
base.  
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Moreover, its capital intensity makes this industry prone to cyclicality in revenues and sudden 
decreases in sales. Such a drop-in revenue may quickly lead to shortage in cash to service debt 
payments since a lot of the proceeds is bound to the refurbishment of machinery.  
Analysts that cover capital-intensive industries often add depreciation back to net income, 
hence obtaining EBITDA. Instead of using net income in performance ratios, analysts use 
EBITDA to mitigate the impact of depreciation, a non-cash expense, on net earnings. 
 
3. Pure commodity industries  
S&P’s CPGP assigns the following attributes to pure commodity industries:   
“Pure commodity companies have little product diversification, and tend to compete on price 
and availability. Where present, brand recognition or product differences are secondary or 
of less importance.” 
These companies manufacture products from natural resources which are used as raw materials 
by other industries. Most oil and gas upstream producers as well as commodity food 
manufacturers are allocated to this sector. 
Commodities are raw materials or primary agricultural products which are used as production 
inputs to obtain finished goods for end-consumers. Their main characteristic is the almost non-
existing degree of differentiation between single products. The commodity good produced by 
one industry player is most of the times just as good as the one from another supplier. 
Commodities are said to appear on markets as homogenous goods in bulk where quality is 
mostly uniform. Uniformity is further on spurred by the fact that commodities must oftentimes 
fulfil pre-specified minimum standards to be traded on exchanges.  
The main differentiating factor is the price which will hence guide buyers in their purchase 
decisions. Commodities’ industries are therefore usually shaped by low profit margins and a 
tough price competition with suppliers seeking to offer the best price possible. This can only 
be achieved by the realization of cost-efficient production techniques and economies of scale. 
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At the same time, commodity producing firms encounter high spending needs in PP&E and 
other fixed assets to keep the production process going. The relation between high spending on 
capital assets and tough price competition poses one of the main challenges the industry faces. 
Another distinct characteristic is that purchases and sales of commodities are mostly carried out 
on exchanges through the use of forward contracts. By usage of this financial instrument, 
suppliers assure getting a fixed price on their good upon delivery in the future and thus hedge 
against a possible deterioration in prices. Buyers on their terms can lock in prices once they 
perceive them to be a good bargain. This trading behaviour is reasonable and justified looking 
at the high price swings, commodities are subject to. Volatility in commodity prices is due to 
three reasons: the first one is the fundamental state of the commodity market. Fundamental in 
this context deals with supply and demand characteristics which in the most basic economic 
sense shape prices. Hence, commodity prices will rise, if the market predicts high future 
demand or a scarcity in the supply of products and fall, if there is oversupply, a high level of 
inventories or a shrinking demand present. The second reason for commodity prices to fluctuate 
substantially is a more technical one which can be traced back to the theory of behavioural 
finance. As mentioned before, commodities are traded through future contracts, which implies 
that there is a lot of traders’ subjective expectations about future economic development 
impounded in prices. These expectations might oftentimes be motivated by the same signals 
and indicators that traders follow. Eventually, there might be incidences of herd instincts where 
a lot of buying or selling happens at the same time causing prices to move substantially. Thirdly, 
commodity prices are sensitive to changes in the macroeconomic landscape. Events of political, 
regulatory or even natural origin have the potential to move prices significantly (e.g. OPEC 
agreeing on production cuts of crude oil or wildfires destroying a sizeable part of the harvest of 
a certain agricultural good).  
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Apart from these factors, commodities are also used a lot by speculators who do not intend to 
actually use the commodity as a primary input for production but who only want to capitalize 
on the heavy fluctuations of prices by making favourable trades before expiration of the futures 
contract/delivery date. This again spurs price volatility notably.  
The combination of price pressure and cost efficiency on the one hand and little product 
differentiation and highly volatile markets on the other hand make the commodity industry an 
undoubtedly risky business for any company but also for investors who intend to invest their 
funds here. 
 
4. National industries and utilities  
Concluding with the last sector, S&P CPGP gives the following outline on characteristics of the 
national industries and utilities sector: 
“Government policy or control, regulation, and taxation as well as tariff policies 
significantly affect the competitive dynamics of the industry.” 
As one can tell by the name, this sector comprises two large sub-industries: utilities and national 
industries. A utility is a service provided by an organization and is intended to serve the broad 
public. Mainly, it is infrastructure services that the society uses in everyday life. Amongst these 
are water and electricity supply, sewage, natural gas and transportation. Companies acting in 
the utilities sector are mainly occupied with running, maintaining and updating the 
infrastructure of facilities. National industries include airport services, highways, rail tracks or 
marine ports and belong to the government. The element linking these two industries is the fact 
that they oftentimes have a monopoly status due to the high capital spending that the entrance 
of a competitor would require or due to concession agreements that eliminate competition. They 
are either state-run (national industries in any case) or private, and always subject to broad 
regulatory regimes and government control. Technological progress has lately helped splitting 
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up some former monopolies and one can observe a trend towards liberalization, deregulation 
and privatization in some markets. Taken the case of competitive markets with several players 
offering utility services, customers will choose the provider offering the best price as there is 
little potential for differentiation through observable quality characteristics.   
From a credit risk perspective, it needs to be mentioned that it is typical for utility firms to carry 
high debt loads due to the significant infrastructure requirements they face to operate their 
businesses. They are hence susceptible to changes in interest rates. Another source of risk is 
authorities imposing new regulation which bring along the need for massive capital spending 
in order to be complied with.  
Regarding revenues, utilities and national industries tend not to be cyclical as they provide 
essential services that consumers are in need of even in times of market downturn.  
Oftentimes, concession agreements include tariff schemes imposed on utility companies which 
leads to limited pricing power but also foreseeable earnings and profitability given a good cost 
management.  
Heavy government intervention/government ownership may provide a hedge in times of 
financial distress as authorities have the possibility to bail out businesses and back them with 
new capital injections.  
 
II.2. Conglomerates 
The inclusion of a sector breakdown into the rating analysis leads to a classification problem 
when there are conglomerates. S&P defines a conglomerate as a diversified company that is 
involved in several subsidiaries which belong to different industry sectors. It is hence exposed 
to different credit risk drivers. Likewise, conglomerates may also benefit from a diversification 
effect due to the spread of operations over different industries.  
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In order to estimate the rating of a conglomerate company, one has to obtain ratings on each 
subsidiary and weight them according to their percentage share of revenues on overall revenue 
generation of the firm. The diversifying effect should be accounted for favourably in the 
“Business Segment Diversification” sub-factor in the “Business Profile” analysis.  
 sector.  In other words, instead of to run the model only one time it is launched as many times 
as macro sectors are involved.  
Looking at the Banco Invest portfolio, an example of a conglomerate is RAR – “Sociedade de 
Controle S.A.”, which comprises subsidiaries acting in the Capital and Asset Intensive sector, 
(Containers-packaging), Pure Commodity sector (Agribusiness and Commodity foods 





Proposal for an adjusted Credit Risk Model 
 
After having introduced the importance of credit rating assessments, Banco Invest’s current 
internal credit scoring model, the set of companies at hand as well as our stance on a possible 
breakdown of this company set into sectors, we would now like to turn to our proposal for an 
adjusted credit rating model.  
The model we designed is a combination of the factors used in the original Banco Invest model, 
being somewhat adjusted and reorganized, inputs from Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s rating 
methodology as well as our own subjective reasoning. Our model can hence be seen as an 
incremental innovation to the original Banco Invest model, preserving several of the past 
features and building up upon them.  
Hence, our model is again subdivided into the four factors “Scale”, “Business Profile”, 
“Financial Profile” and “Financial Policy”.  
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In the following, we would like to start by presenting an illustration of our model composition 
that should provide the reader with guidance through the explanation of the single parts.  
 
III.1 Model Composition 
In order to define the single model parameters, we started by thinking about what the drivers of 
credit risk are and how one could detect them from information that is publicly available. We 
figured out that there are credit risk indicators on the single-borrower level that can be detected 
through fundamental analysis of corporate financial statements. Financial flexibility, the ability 
to raise capital, operating efficiency as well as management quality are also factors worth 
consideration. 
Apart from the assessment on the individual borrower level, we also deem views on industry 
conditions as important. These will obviously be orientated on the definitions of the industry 
sectors given before and will take into account each sector’s specific characteristics. 
Dimensions to be evaluated are, amongst others, competitiveness, regulatory interventions and 
impact of economic cycles.  
 
Scale   Financial Profile  
 Revenues   Leverage Ratios 
Business Profile    Coverage Ratios 
Industry Risk   Profitability Ratios 
 Market Characteristics  Financial Policy  
 Expected Growth   Management Quality 
 Exogenous Factors   Capital Structure 
Company Risk   Liquidity & Payout Policy 
 Competitive Profile    
 Operational Efficiency    
 Geographic Diversification    
 Business Diversification    
 
III.2 Scale Factor 
The first factor to be assessed by the credit risk model is “Scale”. Banco Invest defines “Scale” 
as a measurement of company dimension. Furthermore, it assumes that company dimension 
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and solvency are positively correlated meaning that a company’s financial solidity is supposed 
to grow alongside its business volume. Banco Invest measures the dimension of a company in 
terms of the absolute amount of revenue obtained in the year prior to the rating assessment.  
In the following, we would like to discuss this approach, shed light on benefits and limitations 
and suggest an extension to account for the latter. 
In general, it is undeniable that the “scale” of a company somewhat matters for its credit risk 
classification. The issue is, however, how to measure scale and whether scale as a stand-alone, 
absolute value reveals the entire picture to be projected on credit risk exposure.  
Business volume grows with a broad product line, geographically diversified operations as well 
as a large customer base. Obviously, the larger the dimension of these factors, the more 
favourable corporate credit rating assessments can turn out to be. The ability to service debt 
payments is supposed to increase with business volume due to many reasons. Amongst them 
are a stable positioning of the firm in the market, recognition (and reputation) across customers 
or extensive and well-established relationships with stakeholders like suppliers, vendors, banks 
and authorities. In financial terms, these factors may translate into stable cash flows, economies 
of scale or reduced cost of capital rates which will ultimately support the company in servicing 
its debt payments. 
Sales as the first line in the income statement is an easy to read metric which might give an 
initial idea about the aforementioned characteristics. However, prudent handling of this figure 
is advisable. The credit analyst needs to explore the sources and dynamics underlying to the 
figure he reads. He should wonder whether sales have been growing or decreasing throughout 
the last periods, that is to say whether the company has been expanding or contracting 
operations. Furthermore, a look at the stability over time appears crucial for default risk 
considerations. Given a lot of volatility in sales, the security at which a company will service 
debt payments is questionable. For exceptionally good or bad readings on sales, it should be 
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questioned if they were generated by one-time events (e.g. currency effects) or if they were 
caused by recurring circumstances. It is as well worthwhile asking if the company has been able 
to produce sales out of own strength or if they have been generated by acquisition of external 
businesses units (i.e. inorganic company growth).  
As one can tell, there are a lot of careful considerations to be made while analysing sales. Only 
looking at absolute values without the necessary context and trends in mind hence does not 
seem to be enough.  
Apart from that, sheer company size should not be an exclusive argument. There do exist small 
enterprises which also possess of competitive advantages and dominant market positions. They 
may be niche providers of really specialized products or may serve a very focused market. Their 
business model will enable them to generate revenues which are just as adequate to service debt 
payments as the one from bigger companies, where, in fact, not only amounts of revenue tend 
to be higher but also the cost incurred to produce them just as the quantity of debt borrowed in 
order to finance operations.  
We do acknowledge undoubtedly that there are not only these highly differentiated niche 
providers in the market of small- to middle sized enterprises. It seems also true in many cases 
that small companies may lack the operational and financial flexibility as well as diversification 
necessary to ensure a smooth flow of operations and cash. Particularly during times of adverse 
developments in the overall economy, small companies are the first to be driven out of markets 
since customers turn away more easily or banks are more reluctant to conceive credit to them. 
Small companies lack the scope to absorb such contractions just as they lack the access to 
trustful creditors or shareholders who may back them up with new capital injections.  
Nevertheless, we advocate not to take business volume as a benchmark for default risk per se. 
Small companies should not be “punished” by the pure size of their operations. (In case one 
could even think of this as circular reasoning where small companies face detrimental credit 
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ratings which causes spreads and interest expenses to rise, a matter that could eventually really 
affect their solvency).  
To resolve this shortfall, we suggest extending the analysis of the scale factor. We retain the 
rating attribution for certain quantities of revenue as suggested by Banco Invest since it seems 
a good foundation for the analysis of scale.  
Going back to the very beginning of this paragraph, the original argument was that a company’s 
creditworthiness increases alongside its business dimension. We would hence like to propose 
return on invested capital (ROIC) as an additional measure which is able to capture growth in 
business volume in order to complement the analysis of sales. It shall serve as an additional 
reference, the initial assessment derived from the revenue analysis can be evaluated against.  
From a theoretical point of view, ROIC indicates how much money a company earns on each 
dollar it invests. It is calculated as  
ROIC =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
  =  
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑥 (1−𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)




To allow for a comprehensive analysis, ROIC needs to be set in relation to the corporate 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC). WACC is a measure of how much a company pays 
for its sources of external financing and implicitly accounts for the riskiness involved in the 
entity’s operations. Whenever ROIC exceeds WACC, the company is effectively creating 
value, as its return surpasses the cost incurred for investments. On the opposite, if the difference 
between ROIC minus WACC yields negative results, the company is destroying value.  
We think that ROIC is hence a powerful measure to complement sales as it is not only a 
snapshot of a company’s business volume at one certain point in time but allows for a real 
assessment of value creation and future prospects of the firm. Additionally, the relationship 
holds that a higher ROIC will directly translate into higher cash-flows, which will ultimately 
 - 26 - 
improve the firm’s ability to pay for its debt. Another valuable feature of ROIC is that it 
facilitates the computation of the firm’s growth rate g:            
g = investment rate × ROIC 
 
where “investment rate” is the fraction of earnings that is being retained and reinvested in the 
firm. We think that knowing about the rate, a company grows at, could be an additional interest 
aspect when assessing the business dimension of a firm. We reinforce to note, however, that g 
by itself will not lead to any value creation, it only acts as a magnifier of the relationship 
between ROIC and WACC (value creation if ROIC > WACC, value destruction, if relationship 
is inverse).   
The computation of g is especially interesting on the long-term perspective. One assumes that 
at a certain point in time, returns and investment levels will stabilize as the firm reaches a mature 
state. Hence, any long-term growth in cash-flows will be directly tied to the growth in revenues. 
We think that this consideration additionally underpins our combined analysis of ROIC, 
revenues and the growth factor g.  
Apart from the aspects mentioned before, we think that ROIC is a suitable supplement for the 
scale-factor analysis as it considers business dimension from an investor’s point of view. From 
our perspective, the sales metric gives a notion of the client-side of the business, more precisely 
of quantities and prices customers are purchasing a firm’s products. When evaluating credit 
risk, we might however also want to look at the business from the (debt) investor’s point of 
view to know how much (if any) value is being created with our initial investment. We think 
that this might have explanatory power for the likelihood of recovering the principal investment 
and gaining the promised return as indicated by the WACC.  
The scorecard for the rating attribution of the “Scale” factor can be found in the appendix of 
the report (Appendix 7).  
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III.3 Business Profile 
Just like the “Scale” factor, the “Business Profile” factor is already existing in the original 
Banco Invest model, but got modified and extended in its function for our new model. 
We perceive credit risk to be determined by factors residing on both, the macroeconomic as 
well as the microeconomic level. Therefore, we chose to divide “Business Profile” into two 
major groups of sub-factors, “Industry Risk” and “Company Risk”, a systematization that is 
absent in the Banco Invest model. “Industry Risk” in this context captures macroeconomic 
drivers of credit risk, whereas “Company Risk” refers to potential sources of risk from the 
microeconomic level of the firm. By systematising the structure of “Business Profile” in this 
way, we would like to simplify the analysis of all the possible drivers of credit risk and facilitate 
some clearness in their delimitation from one another. By doing so, we avoid that certain drivers 
get accounted for twice while others are left out of the analysis, shortfalls that we see in some 
instances with the Banco Invest model. We think that a clear definition of all the sub-factors 
being bundled in “Business Profile” is especially important, since it is a purely qualitative factor 
where there is a lot of human judgement inherent, a matter that requires an even more structured 
approach to obtain fairly objective and comparable results.  
Eventually, all the factors described in the following may potentially drive credit risk in a sense 
that they hamper the generation of cash-flows, cut revenues and operating margins or increase 
corporate leverage levels and should be assessed by the credit risk analyst against this 
background.    
 
Industry Risk 
Our rating analysis of “Business Profile” begins with an evaluation of the broad environment 
the company is acting in. In order to understand the drivers of a company’s creditworthiness, it 
is crucial to assess the attractiveness and dynamics of the market, its future prospects, key 
challenges and levels of competition. Moreover, the analysis on a macro-level also sets the 
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stage for evaluating the company on a micro-level (e.g. if the overall market is determined by 
tough competition, the analysis of a company’s competitive position in this market needs to be 
stressed). Hence, we set “Industry Risk” analysis to come first in our consideration of “Business 
Profile”.  
1.) Market Characteristics 
The first sub-factor “Market Characteristics” considers the size of a market. Size in this sense 
is determined by the magnitude of the customer base and its ordinary demand. The credit risk 
analyst should hence look at the number of customers a corporation is currently serving, the 
potential of enticing away clients from other market players and the risk of customers switching 
to competitors’ offerings. 
Apart from the ordinary levels of demand, “Market Characteristics” also assesses the magnitude 
and reasons of possible fluctuations. Special attention in this context has to be paid to cyclicality 
meaning whether demand is prone to fluctuations in the economic cycle or whether it remains 
fairly stable throughout market up- and downturns. 
Other aspects to be considered is the price and income elasticity of demand. Depending on the 
type of goods/services produced, customers might show a different degree of responsiveness in 
terms of adjustments of their optimal consumption choice given the fact that prices or income 
change. In general, in the case of essential goods, an increase in price does not substantially 
change the quantities consumed. On the contrary, luxury goods tend to have a lower demand 
rigidity, henceforth a small change in price or incomes available significantly affects the 
quantities consumed.  
 
2.) Expected Growth 
Expected Growth corresponds to potential market growth. While the previous factor analyses 
the status quo demand and certain product/service characteristics that may impact demand (e.g. 
cyclicality, elasticity), this sub-factor looks at the future prospects of demand. Only if demand 
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grows, a market can gain in volume. Important here is to understand the drivers of future 
demand and to recognise its upper limit from which on the market is saturated.  
To start off, it proves helpful to look into the lifecycle stage of the market. In general, markets 
pass from an introduction, over a growth onto a maturity stage. Early stage markets exhibit a 
lot of growth but at the same time, are a risky endeavour since future demand is pretty uncertain 
and unstable. Mature markets on their terms provide companies with more stability but also 
entail little chances to grow beyond existing levels.  
In general, markets that tend to grow over time are innovative (technology-driven) markets 
where a lot of new products are generated. If the consumer perceives them as value-adding, he 
will strive to purchase the product which ultimately generates revenue for the company.  
Stable markets are those providing goods that are not subject to major fluctuations in customer 
demand.  
Declining markets, in turn, comprise goods that are somewhat outdated or do not represent any 
value added that customers are willing to spend money on. 
Whether markets grow, also depends on their positioning in the supply chain: primary factor 
inputs will be dependent on growth in downstream markets while finished goods markets will 
directly be influenced by end consumer needs.   
Another reason which is hampering market growth are entry barriers. These are typically high 
when the market is capital intensive meaning that it requires high capital expenditures to be 
made previous to the start of operations. Highly regulated industries may also be shielded by 
high barriers to entry e.g. through government imposed limitations on market participants, 
concession agreements or tender offers.  
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3.) Exogenous Factors 
Our definition of “Exogenous Factors” is similar to the equally-named sub-factor in Banco 
Invest’s original model. It contemplates all influencers on credit risk that cannot be controlled 
by the company or industry. These factors lie beyond their scope of action. Namely, these are 
regulatory regimes and government interferences, tax policy, trade and concessions agreements 
and tariffs, amongst others.  
A firm should care about the stability and strictness of the regulatory environment and 
understand implications of new policies on operating requirements and financial results.   
Furthermore, labour related aspects are to be mentioned, e.g. the impact of labour unions, strikes 
and unrest as well as scarcity of workers whose skill set matches job requirements. These factors 
all have the potential to adversely affect a firm’s operations and may hence lead to disruptions 
in flows of income. 
In addition to the previous, manmade and natural catastrophic events should also be accounted 
for. Typically, these are low probability events, nevertheless, whenever there are hints for their 
occurrence, they should be included in the model due to their heavy impact. 
 
Company Risk 
Having evaluated the broad, external environment, a company is acting within, our credit risk 
analysis now turns to sub-factors that trace risk drivers referring to a firm’s micro-level. The 
analysis shall allow for detection of weaknesses stemming from the firm’s strategy, competitive 
positioning and operations that have the potential to negatively impact corporate 
creditworthiness.  
 
1.) Competitive Profile 
“Competitive Profile” is all about the competitive advantage that a firm might have over its 
peers acting in the same industry. Competitive advantages can be originated in various parts of 
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the company, given that they differentiate the firm from its competitors in a decisive manner 
and hence have the potential to substantially add value. 
To explore, whether a company has a competitive advantage, the credit risk analyst should work 
alongside the following categories: 
● Business model: in general terms, a business model describes the rationale of how a firm 
is generating revenues and creating profits. To set up a successful business model, the 
firm needs to be clear about its value proposition for the market. A value proposition is 
a precise statement about a firm’s product and service offering and in how far it is able 
to create value for its clients, leaving it with a competitive edge over its competitors. 
Competitive advantage, in turn, can be obtained through a unique and distinctive 
product/service palette and the degree of innovation attached to them.  
● Strategy: “Strategy” and “Business model” are closely related to each other, however, 
strategy explains more the way of how a company plans to realize its business model. 
Michael T. Porter defined in 1980 three main types of strategies, firms can adopt in 
order to realize their business model and achieve their corporate goals. Namely, there 
are cost leadership, differentiation or focus strategy. “Cost leadership” focuses on being 
the best cost provider, “differentiation” aims at setting a company apart through a unique 
price-product combination while “focus” tries to target a niche market, that no other 
player is able to serve. Competitive advantage will be reached, if the company is the 
best amongst its peer group in implementing the strategy chosen.  
● Marketing mix: a firm can also obtain competitive advantage through its mix of 
marketing instruments. Through adequately addressing its target market, a firm can 
create brand strength and brand reputation which leads to increased market recognition 
and customer loyalty. 
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● Distribution channels: well established distribution channels are a way to increase 
customer satisfaction and represent a service to clients, especially in the fast-paced times 
that we live in nowadays. A firm needs to hence design logistics carefully and think 
about online and offline channels to approach and please customers. 
● Technological progress: Leveraging technological progress will bring a corporation 
ahead of its competitors. Technological progress can come in many different shapes: it 
can either refer to technological excellence in the manufacturing process, in the supply 
chain or can relate to the specific product offering itself. Technology-driven firms being 
able to release innovative, edge-breaking products to the market are amongst the most 
successful in terms of profitability and value creation.  
● Entry barriers (micro-level): whenever a firm is able to restrict its competitors’ access 
to a specific market, it counts with a true competitive advantage. Apart from limited 
access of new competitors, clients on their side will experience high switching cost, in 
a sense that there is no other provider to turn to or changing providers comes at an 
opportunity cost of foregone benefit that could have been realised by staying with the 
original company. Entry barriers come e.g. in the form of unique access to scarce 
resources or trademarks and patents.  
 
2.) Operational Efficiency 
Value creation happens along the production and supply chain of a company. The margin 
between income generated and the cost that needed to be incurred ultimately determines the 
profitability of a company. A company which has efficient operations can increase margins and 
generate substantially more value for its stakeholders than its peers.  
When evaluating how efficiently a company is transforming production inputs in outputs, the 
credit analyst should take into account the following aspects: 
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● Cost management: operational efficiency can be enhanced by increasing the output 
amount per unit of input or lowering the input amount per unit of output. Both can be 
attained through good cost management.  
● Economies of scale: Economies of scale is tightly related to cost management. It results 
from the inverse relationship between production amount and per-unit fixed cost and 
means that a company is getting more efficient because of synergies and scale effects. 
● Flexibility in capital outlays: a company’s ability to react to market conditions is of 
great importance in terms of operational efficiency. Once markets are in contraction and 
demand is low, a firm must be able to reduce its output amount, while in times of 
economic upswing, it must have the capacity to extend operations in order to capture 
returns. This is only possible if a firm has access to financing, be it from equity or debt 
markets. 
● Capital intensity: there are industries that require huge capital investments to either start 
production or maintain property, plant and equipment during the production process 
over time. For companies where this pattern is applicable, it is even harder to obtain 
operational efficiency since they have to invest money on an ongoing basis in order to 
keep production going. Having a vigilant eye for cost and the return on capital 
expenditures is hence crucial due to their magnitude and frequency.  
● Resource utilization: Resource utilization is as well closely tied to the cost reduction 
and economies of scale motifs. Only companies who are able to optimize plant capacity 
and utilization rates while at the same time reduce idle times and waste of production 
inputs will attain operational efficiency. 
● Inventory management: the “just-in-time” principle is common to firms with the highest 
operational efficiency. It means that inventory levels are usually kept as low as possible 
and are only enough to service immediate demand. The reason behind is that there are 
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costs attached to inventories - e.g. storage cost or indirect cost of quality deterioration 
caused by the delay in usage - that can be avoided if production quantity matches 
demand quantity. 
● Bargaining power with vendors: operational efficiency will also be determined by a 
company’s position in a product’s overall manufacturing and marketing process. Roles 
can be, among others, the supplier of primary inputs, the manufacturer in the production 
process and the retailer/wholesaler marketing the product to the end-consumer. 
Depending on the supply/demand relationship, some players in this chain will be 
provided with more bargaining power which will enable them to dictate prices.  
 
3.) Geographic Diversification 
The sub-factor “Geographic Diversification” contemplates diversifying effects from extending 
businesses to multiple geographies. In general, international diversification may decrease a 
firm’s exposure to credit risk in a sense that adverse developments in one market may be 
absorbed by positive trends in other markets. If geographic markets are chosen carefully, 
international diversification may lead to cost savings, economies of scale and a broader 
customer base. However, it can also introduce complexity e.g. through currency translation 
effects as well as exposure to country-specific risks which can be of political, natural or social 
origin.  
Actually measuring the risk exhibited by different nationalities turns out to be challenging 
because we cannot compare the benefit of international diversification across developed 
markets (low risk countries and with stable currencies) with diversification into emerging 
markets (high risk countries with unstable currencies). The easiest and most efficient method 
for an adequate assessment of country risk seems looking into where a company’s revenue 
comes from. Taken the case that a company generates 50% of revenue in “safe countries” and 
the remainder in “risky countries”, the final diversification riskiness will be equal to the average 
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between the respective country ratings weighted according to the respective amount of revenue 
generated. In order to be able to set up a rating table for “Geographic Diversification”, we 
decided to distinguish between “low risk profile diversification” and “high risk profile 
diversification”. We assumed that every time the average calculation resulted in values higher 
or equal to a 6/BB-rating, geographic diversification is classified to have a low-risk profile, 
while every time the rating is lower than 6/BB-rating, it represents a high-risk profile. In the 
excel model accompanying the report, there is embedded a detailed table by Moody’s with 
current sovereign ratings that are used for the calculation of the rating for geographic 
diversification. 
 
4.) Business Segment Diversification 
Business segment diversification refers to the portfolio of industry sectors a firm acts within. 
An entity can have different lines of businesses or it can be a conglomerate, bundling different, 
independently operating subsidiaries under its umbrella. Here again, diversification may 
provide a proper hedge against downturns in one specific industry as they may be offset by 
upswings in another one. However, if the industries are highly correlated and move alongside, 
no diversification effect will be realised. Furthermore, being present in different industries 
definitely extents complexity and the expertise required to run the business which may 
ultimately pose a true challenge to the firm’s management.  
The credit analyst hence needs to consider carefully, how well a company manages its 
diversification into different segments and whether aggregate credit risk exposure gets 
diminished when compared to the sum of the single risk exposures of the different business 
units.   
To allow for converting the factor assessment in an actual rating score, we again developed our 
own scorecard for the “Business Profile” factor which can be found in Appendix 8.  
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III.4 Financial Profile  
 “Financial Profile” is a rather quantitatively inspired part of our credit rating model. It is a deep 
dive into the firm’s solvency and financial coverage which, by means of ratio and margin 
analysis, shall provide a differentiated picture of the company’s financial health. 
“Financial Profile” essentially maintains most of Banco Invest’s analysis approach. However, 
we introduced three modifications: we added a profitability ratio, decided to limit the use of the 
(Funds from Operations-Capex)-to-debt ratio and we differentiated among sectors meaning that 
we adjust the relative weightings of the ratio variables according to sector characteristics. Our 
rationale for including a profitability ratio was that we deem the ability to generate profits to be 
indicative for a company’s survival on the medium to long-run. (FFO-Capex)/Debt has been 
substituted by FCF/Debt and RCF/Debt ratios in order to better account for financial flexibility 
stemming from changes in working capital and capital expenditure.  
In the following, we will discuss the composition of the ratios, their meaning as well as the 




A leverage ratio is any kind of metric that sets an entity’s level of debt in relation to other 
information from corporate financial statements. The most common leverage ratios are the debt-
to-total-assets and debt-to-equity ratio. They are indicative of the sources of financing a 
company is using to fund its operations. The capital structure of a business typically has 
significant impact on its profitability and solvency. It determines the cost of capital an entity 
needs to be able to pay for as well as the rate of return it can obtain from its investments and 
operations. 
Being highly levered means using a significant part of debt financing in the capital mix, a matter 
that can fuel growth in case a business generates more return on debt than it is paying for. On 
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average, investors require a smaller rate of return on debt than they do for equity investments. 
An additional perk of using debt is the tax deductibility of interest payments which effectively 
lowers the tax expense a firm has to pay for. Nevertheless, choosing elevated levels of leverage 
is also a risky endeavour, particularly in times when a business is in decline. Debt, other than 
equity, incorporates fixed claims from investors that need to be serviced. If the firm cannot 
fulfil these claims, it has to file for bankruptcy. Debt is hence a risky business whenever there 
is a lot of volatility in sales and the earnings derived from them.    
• Debt-to-EBITDA ratio: Debt-to-EBITDA sets an entity’s borrowings in relation to its 
earnings before taxes, depreciation and amortization. Debt-EBITDA ratio reflects the 
amount of debt that needs to be paid for from the operating cash earnings still including 
non-cash expenses like depreciation and amortization. It can also be interpreted as the 
amount of time a business would need to pay down all of his debt positions by using its 
operating income. Not subtracting depreciation and amortization charges is especially 
relevant for capital-intensive industries where the amount of non-cash expenses per 
period are high. Subtracting those may lead to distortions in the picture of how much 
cash a firm really has at its disposal to pay for debt obligations. 
Debt-to-EBITDA has proved to be a reliable indicator for the financial health and 
solvency of a company and is one of the key ratios commonly used by creditors and 
rating agencies. Due to its informative power, it is frequently included as covenant in 
loan agreements where it requires debtors to stay below a certain threshold value.  
 
Interest Coverage Ratios 
Coverage ratios represent another group of metrics which aim at gauging a company’s ability 
to pay for its financial obligations. 
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• EBITDA-to-interest ratio: Interest coverage ratios divide operating income by the 
amount of interest expenses incurred. In general, interest coverage ratios reveal how 
many times a business is earning its interest expense.  
There are two critical points that one should keep in mind when assessing this coverage 
ratio: EBITDA-to-interest expense tends to deliver higher readings than EBIT-to-
interest expense because the numerator is larger. The difference in ratios is especially 
large for industries that entail high amounts of depreciation and amortization. EBITDA 
coverage ratio will hence produce a more liberal indicator of a firm’s debt payment 
capacity while EBIT coverage ratio leads to more conservative results.  
Regarding the denominator of the ratio, one could potentially argue that interest expense 
does not cover the full amount of fixed claims that come from the use of debt 
instruments. A firm might as well default if it misses out on the principal repayment. 
Choosing the total-debt-service coverage ratio (EBITDA/(interest expense + principal 
amount)) instead of interest coverage ratios may fix this problem. 
 
Cash-flow coverage ratios 
In contrast to the aforementioned interest coverage ratios, cash flow coverage ratios set cash 
flow statement measures in relation to total debt loads. They shall serve as an indicator of the 
entity’s ability to service debt payments through the use of different types of cash flows it has 
at hand.   
• Retained Cash Flow-to-Net Debt: This ratio compares cash flow before working capital 
movements and capital expenditures and after dividend payments to total debt. It is 
helpful to gauge the availability of cash to repay debt after shareholder interests have 
been paid for. It is particularly useful for companies that pay high cash dividends since 
those ultimately represent a restriction in the availability of cash to pay for interest 
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charges. By excluding any changes in working capital and capex, RCF-to-Debt gives a 
notion of financial stability before making any decisions about re-investment into 
current or fixed assets. We use this ratio consistently throughout the different sector 
models. 
• Cash Flow from Operations-to-Debt: This ratio sets cash flow after working capital 
movements and dividend payments in relation to total debt. The importance of this ratio 
(and the reason for why we removed (Funds from Operations–Capex)-to-Debt) lies in 
the role of working capital. Working capital is a key influencer of a company’s cash 
flow generation. Companies which are working capital-intensive can reduce potential 
losses during market downturns by selling off inventories and investing in a lower 
amount of raw materials. Both actions will reduce the amount of funds that is tied up in 
working capital and will free up new cash for debt repayment. Funds from operations, 
however, is entirely excluding any effects from adjustments in working capital. We 
hence think, that cash flow from operations is the more suitable measure as companies 
can use their flexibility in working capital levels to smooth stressed cash levels in times 
of solvency affecting events. We decided to use this ratio for the “Services and branded 
products sector”, because high levels of working capital are a special feature of the 
industries bundled there.  
• Free Cash Flow-to-Debt: The same reasoning as in the previous paragraph can be 
applied for FCF/Debt with the difference that this time, additionally to working capital 
movements, also capital expenditures are accounted for in free cash flows. Particularly 
capital and asset-intensive companies may or may not have flexibility to cut capital 
expenditures in times of financial distress. Some might be able to because they can 
postpone their investment in property, plant and equipment while others will be forced 
to maintain their levels of outlays due to the nature of their business. Given a business 
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has some sort of flexibility, this might be helpful in times of market downturns, as more 
cash will be left over for debt repayment. We use this ratio in the “Capital and asset-
intensive”, “Pure Commodity” and “National Industries and Utilities” sector, since 
capital outlays are of significant magnitude there.  
 
Profitability Ratios 
Profitability metrics are one of the most common tools in financial analysis. They are able to 
capture a firm’s operating efficiency and ability to realize economies of scale and hence deliver 
valuable insights on operating performance. Profitability analysis can make use of two types of 
measures, margins and returns.  
• EBITDA margin: Since a profitability ratio was absent in Banco Invest’s model, we 
have decided to include EBITDA margin as a fifth ratio. It is calculated as EBITDA 
divided by revenue and thus indicates the relation between revenues and the amount of 
revenues which is left after paying for both, cost of goods sold and operating expenses 
such as wages, raw materials. EBITDA margin can be understood as a measure of 
efficiency of operations as well as an indicator of managerial skill since the type and 
amount of operating expenses a company faces will mainly depend on management’s 
decisions. Due to this informational value attached to EBITDA margin (it exactly 
represents the cut between operating, non-cash and financing expenses), we consider it 
more suitable for credit risk analysis than gross margin ((revenues-COGS)/revenues) or 
net margin (net income/revenues). Gross margin does not seem suitable because it does 
not include all expenses incurred by operations and hence overstates the relationship 
between income and revenues. Likewise, net margin does not appear to be a good 
profitability measure because it includes effects from aspects that the firm cannot have 
any impact on, like tax payments.  
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All of the aforementioned ratios are computed using financial statement data of the last year 
available before rating assessment. The scorecard table for the “Financial Policy” factor can be 
found in Appendix 9. Threshold values for the classification of a company into a specific rating 
notch are based on research by Moody’s (references in the appendix) and Banco Invest’s 
original tool. Over the long-run, they would need to be reviewed and verified to secure that they 
correspond with current market conditions.  
Moreover, it seems advisable to start the analysis by calculating ratios based on figures of the 
most current financial statements but then substantiating these values by ratios from previous 
years. In this way, credit analysts can detect major fluctuations from non-recurring events that 
may impact the precision of the rating outcome. Moreover, they will get a sense of the 
tendencies in financial ratios over time which is a useful add-on for the rating analysis.  
As a final remark, credit analysts might as well not want to stop by only performing financial 
ratio analysis for the company to be rated but also search for ratios of closely related peers, they 
can benchmark their ratios against.  
 
 
III.5 Financial Policy  
The fourth and last factor of the default rating model is “Financial Policy”. The original Banco 
Invest model considers the accessibility of additional financing granted by shareholders, the 
transparency and separation of powers within the firm and management’s general attitude 
towards risk. 
We thought that this set up of the factor did not capture all the relevant variables that drive 
credit risk. Henceforth, we restructured “Financial Policy” and now evaluate the quality of firm 
management, its choice of capital structure and the liquidity situation. “Financial Policy” shall 
thus account for the “human factor” in default risk in a sense that all of the aforementioned 
aspects are actively driven by business executives’ attitudes, reasoning and choices.   
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 Quality of Firm Management 
“Quality of Firm Management” directly assesses the performance of persons in leadership 
positions at the respective firms.  
This sub-factor might be hard to assess though when being an outsider to the company. 
Moreover, each credit analysts may come to a different judgment in light of the subjectivity 
involved in the assessment. Facing these difficulties, we will subsequently present three 
categories, management quality can be evaluated against. These categories shall serve as a 
guideline to the credit risk analyst and shall make the grading of management quality 
transparent and comprehensible.  
• Leadership & Agency Conflicts: A good way to start the analysis of management quality 
seems to be searching for evidence of strong leadership and a vigorous corporate culture. 
Indicators are e.g. the degree of fluctuation in top management positions or the extent 
to which management’s and employees’ interests and goals are aligned to each other. 
Furthermore, it also seems advisable to consider the overall reputation and track record 
of past performance of key positions like the one of the CEO, CFO or COO. Certain 
managers will be known for responsible, sustainable leadership while others may have 
made a name for their risk-loving behaviour and a lack of reasonable judgement. Closely 
following up on news and press releases about the firm to be rated are probably the best 
approaches to address these categories. Looking into whether the firm is a family 
business or a multinational conglomerate might also play a role. Usually, executives of 
family offices are tied to the business more closely because it may be inherited and 
passed on over generations. In this case, executives do not only represent the 
management but also the owners of the firm. In contrast, for big multinational 
conglomerates, managers (who do not hold any significant ownership position) may not 
feel as related to the core of the business. They may rather perceive the firm as a “value-
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generating unit” and try to exploit its resources as much as they can – at the risks this 
may involve. They may care more about maximising shareholder value than they care 
about the safety of generating stable cash flows to service debt investors’ claims - a 
phenomenon commonly known as agency conflicts. Agency problems among business 
executives have the potential to affect the solvency situation of the company 
significantly.  
• Compliance: Another aspect to be looked at when rating management quality is its 
compliance with regulatory and accounting regimes. A prominent case where 
management did not comply with accounting standards was the fraud committed by 
Worldcom in 2002. After incorrectly accounting for $3.8 billions of operating expenses 
over five quarter’s time, Worldcom had to file for bankruptcy when an internal audit 
uncovered the fraud.  
• Corporate Actions: A less apparent but still helpful indicator to explore management 
quality may be corporate communication. For example, one can find out if there have 
been any ad-hoc statements or press releases during incidents of bad (credit-risk 
affecting) news or if management rather tried to conceal adverse information until the 
last moment possible. Given the fact that management commits to timely disclosure will 
leave investors reassured that they do not have to fear of being caught by bad surprises. 
In case, proper communication is absent, there are certain observable actions, 
management tends to engage in in the presence of solvency problems: 
o dropping dividends to free-up more cash for debt repayments; 
o changing operations to reduce operational risk that spurs a possible default; 
o issuing equity; 
o issuing or rolling over debt and renegotiating borrowing terms; 
o selling off assets; 
 - 44 - 
o engaging in M&A activities in an attempt to sell the whole firm.  
Naturally, none of these actions can be seen indicative of solvency problems as a stand-
alone argument. Nevertheless, if the evaluation of management performance turns out 
to be unfeasible due to non-accessibility of information, looking for these activities 
might be helpful in gauging credit risk exposure. 
 
Capital Structure 
We already quantitatively analysed capital structure decisions in “Leverage Ratios” in the 
“Financial Profile” factor. Nevertheless, we would like to dedicate some qualitative analysis to 
the choices of financing as well since we consider them crucial for default analyses. We will 
not assess capital structure from a corporate finance point of view where concerns are centred 
around the optimal capital structure which maximizes firm value. In our case, we rather look at 
the composition of capital structure from a risk perspective. All of our analysis will centre 
around the questions of which types of financing instruments are used and what their 
implications on credit risk exposure are.  
• Characteristics of Debt Instruments: Debt securities can differ significantly in terms of 
their characteristics and hence their risk profile. Credit analysts should run along the 
following aspects when evaluating credit risk inherent in different debt instruments: 
o  Seniority: the seniority of a debt instrument reflects where it ranks in terms of 
priority of its repayment. In general, debtholders are the first in line for repayment 
of their claims, shareholders follow thereafter. Amongst debtholders, the ones 
holding “senior” securities will be paid with priority to the ones holding “junior” 
securities. Senior loans hence offer debtors some sort of downside protection in case 
of a default event. 
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o  Security: there are secured and unsecured fixed income instruments. The ones being 
secured pose collateral meaning that they are backed by a real asset of the same 
value that the creditor has a claim on in case the company cannot pay back debt with 
cash. Unsecured bonds are “bare” in this sense, meaning that there is no insurance 
provided for them. If the company goes bankrupt, all of the debt investment will be 
gone. 
o Covenants: a covenant is an agreement attached to a debt instrument determining 
certain activities that will or will not be carried out in future. For example, 
documentation of a newly issued loan security might state the extent to which a 
company is allowed to increase the level of leverage thereafter. Covenants can also 
come in form of financial ratios a company commits itself to meet or they may fix 
the level of dividend payments or working capital. All of these measures serve as 
protection for the debtholders, as they are supposed to limit the exposure to default 
risk. If a lending firm breaks a covenant, the debtholder usually has the right to call 
back his obligation at immediate effect. A company’s track record of compliance 
with covenants might on top represent a good indication for its attitude towards 
credit risk.     
o Credit Enhancement: credit enhancement is a tool used to obtain better conditions 
for outstanding debt. The borrower wants to hence reassure the lender of its 
creditworthiness by providing e.g. personal or parent company guarantees on its 
debt securities. 
o Variability of interest rates: interest bearing debt instruments can require fixed, 
floating or variable rate payments. Floating and variable rates are riskier because 
debtors will not be able to know upfront what they have to pay in interest expenses.   
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If a company readily provides covenants, poses collateral as a pledge or has any form 
of credit enhancement in place, it can arguably be seen as lower risk investment as there 
are certain hedges against the adverse effects from credit events.  
• Accessibility of Sources of Financing: There are different sources of financing a 
company can dispose of, namely internal financing through earnings and external 
financing through debt and equity capital markets. While it is desirable to rely on 
internal sources of financing as much as possible, most companies will have to turn to 
capital markets at a certain point in time in order to fund investments that surpass 
internal resources. We have already discussed the characteristics of debt instruments 
that can make up a part of corporate capital structures. However, it is also worthwhile 
figuring out how well the company can access other sources of financing given that debt 
accessibility is exhausted and funding needs are still present. This ability is particularly 
important from a credit risk point for view for instances where interest payments have 
to be made but cash resources are exhausted.  
Aspects to be considered are: 
o  is the company able to raise equity financing with ease given that it has reached its 
limit of credit exposure but still needs additional resources? Trust and reputation on 
equity markets play a significant role as well as the firm’s past development of share 
price and payout policy 
o are there any stockholders with a major stake that are likely to back up the company 
with new capital injections even in times of financial distress? 
o does the company have well-established relationships with banks? does it raise 
financing from several different banking institutions or does it only rely on one key 
contact? 
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o  is the firm also able to exploit alternative sources of financing like venture capital 
or private equity? 
o Is the firm eligible to receive government aid or is it even state-run and hence backed 
up financially by authorities? 
 
Liquidity & Payout Policy 
In broad terms, default risk is the risk of falling short of financial resources to make debt related 
payments when they are due. In the “Financial Profile” factor, we analysed corporate solvency 
by means of leverage and coverage ratios. In the following, we would like to shed light on the 
liquidity situation of a firm. Solvency and liquidity, though both describing an entity’s ability 
to service debt payments, differ from one another in their meaning. Solvency assesses the 
capacity of meeting long-term financial obligations. It evaluates whether a business owns more 
than owes. Liquidity is more tilted towards the ability of meeting short-term commitments and 
of converting assets into cash quickly.  
• Liquidity Situation: In order to analyse the liquidity situation, it is necessary to look at 
positions of current assets and current liabilities on the corporate balance sheet. Current 
commonly means that maturity for these obligations lies within the reach of one year’s 
time. The relation of the amount of assets to the amount of liabilities as well as assets’ 
convertibility into cash will be indicative for the firm’s financial health.   
Current assets are: 1) Cash and cash equivalents, 2) Short-term investments, 3) 
Receivables, 4) Prepaid expenses and 5) Inventories 
While the first item really indicates how much liquidity the firm has at immediate 
disposal, all of the subsequent captions are supposed to be converted into cash within 
12 months. Inventories count with the longest time to cash, since they first have to be 
converted into a receivable position after being sold, which will subsequently be turned 
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into cash. Short-term investments are closer to be cashed-in, since they are normally 
directly marketable. 
With regard to credit risk analysis, it seems fruitful to thoroughly walk through each 
short-term caption on the balance sheet and evaluate the risk potential attached to it. To 
give an example why this is useful, one should consider accounts receivable for a 
moment. While its absolute reading will increase the amount of total current assets and 
hence the magnitude to which short-term debt payments can be serviced, nothing is said 
about the probability that they will really be converted into cash within one year. Firms 
indeed have defaulted in the past because they sold assets to clients on a term payment 
agreement, booked an accounts receivable position accordingly, but eventually never 
got paid by the client due to diverse reasons. 
Another example is inventories. If the company shows high levels of inventories, credit 
analysts need to keep in mind that this might lead to additional cost: on the one hand, 
there are direct cost like the ones for storage and on the other hand there might arise 
indirect cost from a deterioration in the goods’ quality or a decline in market prices up 
to the point they get sold. Moreover, it is also evidence of a lack of management skill to 
plan operations according to current demand. Hence, just-in time production and limited 
inventory levels should be considered favourably for in credit risk assessment. 
The counterpart of current assets are current liabilities. Short-term obligations can be 
commercial paper and notes, but also payments to suppliers fall under this category.  
Typically, they appear on the balance sheet under the following captions: 1) Trade 
payables, 2) Short-term debt and 3) Accrued liabilities. 
Current liabilities represent the debt claims that come due in the near-term future and 
that need to be serviced in case to keep the firm’s operations going. Hence, incoming 
cash-flows streams of a firm should be at least sufficient to pay for interest and principal 
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payments caused by short-term assets. Following the idea of matching short-term assets 
with short-term liabilities, the credit risk analyst can have a view on the reading for 
working capital as it represents the difference between these two groups. 
All of the aforementioned balance sheet items are used to calculate the following 
liquidity ratios. There are: 














As we can tell from the ratios, all measures indicate the ability of near-cash assets to 
pay off current liabilities. The ratios only differ in what they include in the numerator. 
While the quick ratio excludes inventories to only account for real “quick” assets, the 
cash ratio is even more restrictive by only including assets with almost immediate 
liquidity. Calculating these ratios and benchmarking them against ratios obtained for 
close competitors may be a useful value-add for the credit risk analysis.  
Another useful metric to be considered for liquidity analysis is the cash conversion cycle 
(CCC). It returns the number of days a company needs to convert each investment in 











The shorter this time span, the more efficient a business is in converting financial 
resource inputs into cash-flows. For some industries, CCC can even turn negative. 
Especially retailers which exercise a lot of power over suppliers will build up large 
payables position and first pay them off a good while after they have collected form 
 - 50 - 
clients. This effectively gives them a type of time-restricted credit they can use to invest 
or pay for immediate debt obligations.   
• Payout Policy: Apart from capital structure decisions, management will also determine 
a payout policy at which a firm makes dividend payments to its shareholders – or not. 
According to Modigliani & Miller’s dividend irrelevance theory, payout policy does not 
matter in a frictionless market because, if not distributed, earnings will be incorporated 
favourably in the market’s assessment of a firm’s share price and hence, shareholders 
will not be worse off. However, this stance can be questioned for real life settings as 
payout policy allows for certain assumptions about the firm and its financial health.  
A firm that is distributing dividends is effectively lowering its potential cash position 
and hence its ability to respond to short-term cash needs. Furthermore, it is foregoing 
positive NPV investment projects that could be financed by internally generated 
resources. From a credit risk point of view, dividend payments could hence be seen 
critically. 
Nevertheless, this is only one part of the entire truth. The part still missing is 
shareholders’ expectations and markets’ assessment of a company not paying any 
dividends. 
In particular, stable and mature firms (also known as value stocks) are somewhat 
supposed to pay dividends. If management decides to drop dividend payments for a 
certain period, this will be perceived by markets as a sign of financial distress as they 
will accuse the firm of lacking the financial strength to payout to their shareholders. 
Subsequently, share prices will most certainly fall which leaves the company with a 
declining market capitalization. 
As we can see, there is a trade-off inherent in management’s decision of how much 
earnings to distribute as dividends and how much to reinvest into the business. Again, 
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management needs to consider the company’s current situation, its profile (whether it is 
rather perceived to be a value or growth stock) and any investment opportunities at hand. 






Implications of Sector Characteristics on Model Variables 
 
So far, we gave an overview of specific sector characteristics and introduced our own credit 
scoring model factor by factor. Now, we would like to match both components explaining the 
sector characteristics’ impact on the assessment of each model factor and subsequently deriving 
factor weights which will determine the impact of the single variables on the aggregate credit 
risk assessment.  
Weights for the new model were estimated by grouping Moody’s individual industry rating 
models into the four industry sectors as defined previously. Since Banco Invest follows 
Moody’s rating structure closely and the new credit rating model does not change in terms of 
the four main factors (Scale, Business Profile, Financial Profile and Financial Policy), we 
calculated averages across all individual industry rating models to obtain weights for those four 
main factors. These served as a first guideline. Since the new credit rating model changed 
significantly regarding sub-factors, we used our own reasoning to come up with a division of 
the single sub-factor weights. Eventually, we back-tested the weights we obtained by running 
our own credit rating model using company information of the Banco Invest company portfolio 
of previous years and comparing our rating results to those obtained by the bank applying the 
old model. We also tested for various defaulted Portuguese and Spanish companies whether our 
model was able to capture the default and adjusted weights whenever we deemed it necessary. 
After all, we obtained weights which on the one hand are close to Moody’s average weights 
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when being summed up per factor, and on the other hand lead to persistent results when being 
compared to the Banco Invest ratings and can as well be explained by our reasoning for the 
relative importance for each sector credit risk model.  
In the following, we will explain how variables that drive credit risk differ alongside specific 
industry characteristics. The explanations given per sector shall serve as a guideline, the credit 
analyst can readily refer back to when evaluating single companies. 
 
 
IV.1 Services and Branded Products Sector 
 
Distribution of factor weights for Services and Branded Products Sector: 
 
Services and Branded Products 
   
Rating Factors Sub-Factors Weighting 
Scale  5% 
 Revenue 5% 
   
Business Profile  35% 
 Industry & Country Risk 
 Market Characteristics 5% 
 Expected Growth 4% 
 Exogenous Factors 3% 
 Company Risk 
 Competitive Profile 8% 
 Operating Efficiency 4% 
 Geographic Diversification 5% 
 Business Segments 6% 
   
Financial Profile  45% 
 Debt / EBITDA 8% 
 EBITDA / Interest Expense 8% 
 RCF / Net Debt 12% 
 CFO / Debt 12% 
 EBITDA Margin 5% 
   
Financial Policy   15% 
 Management Quality 5% 
 Capital Structure 4% 
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1.) Scale Factor (5%) 
Most specific about the Services and Branded Products (SBP) sector is its direct interaction 
with the end-consumer market that represents the source of revenue generation. Quantities sold 
to markets will hence directly depend on saving and spending patterns prevalent in society. 
Furthermore, sales quantities will fluctuate with economic cycles according to product’s 
dispensability in consumers’ everyday life.  
Prices and margins that can be realized during the sales process depend on a range of 
circumstances and conditions. Consumers’ perceptions of a company’s degree of innovation 
and market leadership impact the price premium that can be charged. A differentiating edge 
over competitors in the form of value-added product features that are unique to a single 
company will increase margins. On the contrary, limited ability to pass inflation in input prices 
on to end-consumers may squeeze margin profitability.  
Moreover, companies that cover large market volumes may exercise power over suppliers and 
obtain price discounts for production inputs as well as operating cost reductions through 
economies of scale.  
We assign a 5%-weight to this factor because revenue streams are reasonably stable, at least for 
non-discretionary products. For more volatile products, fluctuations should be fairly predictable 
by looking at indicators of future economic activity.   
 
2.) Business Profile 
Industry Risk (12%): 
• Market Characteristics 5%: End-consumers determine the demand for the SBP sector. 
Consequently, demand moves alongside indicators that reflect their financial situation 
and spending power. Those are e.g. changes in household net worth, unemployment 
rate, level of salaries and level of disposable income. More intangible factors like 
consumer sentiment and trends may also play a role. Furthermore, dynamics in demand 
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are as well directly related to the nature of the product at hand. Non-discretionary, non-
durable products tend to be least responsive to changes in the aforementioned factors, 
while discretionary, durable products show higher swings in demand.  
• Expected Growth 4%: Expected growth rates are perceived to be rather stable and will 
converge into the overall GDP growth rate in the long-run. There may be phases of 
exceptional growth momentum for companies with outstanding, innovative products 
that perfectly satisfy consumer demand or even generate new demand that cannot be 
met by competitors. Apart from this, growth rates are also higher for emerging markets 
than developed market countries since the former are less saturated due to lower market 
penetration in the past and now catch up with the latter due to a pick-up in demand and 
population growth.  
• Exogenous Factors 3%: Exogenous factors are of minor importance to the course of 
business for SBP companies. Important to mention are regulation and policies regarding 
the workforce like governments’ and labour unions’ impact on wages which will 
directly affect the level of operational cost. On the demand side, federal incentive 
programs can temporarily lead to jumps in demand while tax increases will dampen 
potential for revenue generation.   
Company Risk (17%): 
• Competitive Profile 8%: Succeeding in the “Competitive Profile” factor is more 
important for SBP companies than for all other sectors and has the potential to 
significantly impact financial performance stability and the corporate risk profile. In 
order to be able to capture price premiums, a SBP firm needs to capitalize on its brand 
equity. Strong brand equity is formed by brand reputation and recognition amongst 
customers which is directly connected to superior product quality, level of technological 
sophistication, design or user friendliness leading to customer satisfaction which is 
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surpassing the one for competitor products. A way to achieve customer satisfaction and 
brand reputation is continuous innovation driven by diligent market research and the 
early recognition of trends and tendencies. If a firm does not achieve to obtain a 
differentiating edge over competitors, the only way to remain in the market is offering 
lower prices. This observation results in two clearly separable business models for SBP 
companies, namely product differentiation and cost leadership, which need to be 
pursued consistently and communicated efficiently to the end-consumer to allow for 
easy orientation and effective purchase decisions. Another source of competitive 
advantage is a strong salesforce and a tight network of distribution channels which make 
products and services easily accessible and visible to end-consumers. 
• Operating Efficiency 4%: Manufacturing and marketing products in a cost-efficient 
manner is undeniably important for SBP companies. A way which is often chosen 
nowadays to accomplish operating efficiency is outsourcing manufacturing processes 
and only performing R&D, marketing and control functions in-house. The rationale 
behind is that a major cost driver for SBP companies is labour cost which can be 
decreased by shifting operations to low-wage countries. Other than that, it has to be 
mentioned that expenditures in fixed assets are substantially lower for this sector than 
for others which leads to lower operational leverage and higher flexibility in cost 
adjustments due to a higher proportion of variable cost. We hence only assign a weight 
of 4% to this factor.  
• Geographic Diversification 5%: Being geographically diversified in a sense that 
products are marketed to a range of geographic areas is of utmost importance for SBP 
companies. While the North American and Western European market are saturated with 
a vast product offering, emerging (Asian) markets are said to be the new revenue drivers 
due to their growing middle class and increases in disposable income. Apart from that, 
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extending business to different geographic areas increases volume which may help to 
obtain economies of scale, enhanced brand recognition and increased negotiating power 
with suppliers, all of which will ultimately result in entry barriers for competitors. 
However, firms need to keep in mind that consumers are different across regional 
markets due to differences in cultures and value perceptions. Hence, regional expertise 
and careful positioning on international markets is key to capture the benefits from 
geographic diversification. 
• Business Segment Diversification 6%: As mentioned before, diversification will lead to 
an extension of SBP businesses which, if carried out thoroughly, can result in higher 
cash-flows and enhanced company performance. This does not only apply for 
geographic but also for business segment diversification. In segment diversification, a 
company multiplies the markets it is offering products to, thus capturing cross-selling 
potential, increasing presence and strengthening brand recognition. Segment 
diversification will reduce the exposure to adverse effects from regulation or volume 
contraction in one particular market area and offset them with new growth opportunities 
in another segment. 
We have over-weighted the risk factors residing on the micro-level of the firm because we think 
that these factors are more decisive for financial stability than overall macro-economic 
conditions. 
 
3.) Financial Profile 
• Debt/EBITDA 8%: This leverage ratio determines the solvency of a company by setting 
debt in relation to operating income. SBP companies have lower funding needs in terms 
of re-investment into fixed operating asset than e.g. capital and asset-intensive 
industries. Here, the challenge resides more in the funding of current assets like 
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inventories and accounts payable. Hence, we consider this ratio important, but less 
relevant than cash-flow related metrics. 
• EBITDA/Interest Expense 8%: EBITDA-to-interest expense evaluates the ability to 
service interest payments from operating income. Here again, the same reasoning 
applies as for the previous ratio. We consider it important in the assessment for SBP 
companies because solvency is the key for financial stability over the long-run. 
Nonetheless, solvency does not imply liquidity at any given moment; a company can 
encounter liquidity shortages given a healthy solvency situation. Hence, this ratio as 
well has a lower weight than the following cash-flow coverage ratios. 
• RCF/Net Debt 12%: Retained cash flow-to net debt sets cash flow after paying for 
shareholder dividends and before changes in working capital and capex in relation to 
debt loadings. In this way, it indicates debt repayment capacity before the company 
makes any re-investments into the fixed or current asset base or takes on new investment 
projects. We consider this ratio as informative in the context of SBP companies and 
hence assign a weight of 12%.   
• CFO/Debt 12%: Cash flow from operations-to-debt measures the proportion of cash 
flow after paying for shareholder dividends and changes in working capital to total debt 
loads. We consider this ratio very relevant for SBP companies because it allows for 
making assumptions about adjustments in the level of working capital that a company 
may carry out as a measure to increase debt repayment capacity. Proper working capital 
management is crucial for SBP companies since they maintain numerous relationships 
with suppliers and clients where cash circulates on a dynamic basis. If a SBP company 
encounters problems to service debt payments, it might adjust working capital levels by 
decreasing receivable or increasing payable levels to free-up more cash. 
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• EBITDA Margin 5%: EBITDA margin is an indicator of operational efficiency and 
sound cost management. Undoubtedly, this is an important aspect to consider for SBP 
firms, but is not a core driver of credit risk exposure, which makes us assign a weight 
of 5%. 
 
4.) Financial Policy 
• Management Quality 5%: Management’s skill will be primarily challenged by the 
labour-intensity of SBP firms on the one hand and by the direct exposure to end-
consumer markets on the other hand. Hence, running those businesses requires a lot of 
social competencies and the ability to empathize and communicate efficiently along all 
sides of the business.  
Furthermore, management needs to dispose of the flexibility necessary to reinvent the 
product portfolio, adjust variable parts of operations and react to emerging business 
opportunities anytime market conditions require it to do so.  
• Capital Structure 4%: In comparison to other sectors, SBP industries are less capital 
intensive. Nevertheless, easily accessible sources of financing are important for these 
companies, too, since they can obtain competitive advantage and raise entry barriers for 
competitors when growing large.   
• Liquidity 6%: SBP companies participate in a very fast-lived business environment, 
constantly being driven by the latest upcoming trends and consumer preferences. These 
conditions require SBP companies to take on business opportunities quickly as they 
emerge in order to avoid that their offering becomes outdated and obsolete. To be able 
to do so, there is the need of certain financial flexibility and capital buffers to be invested 
quickly. Hence, a good liquidity position can translate into a major competitive 
advantage for SBP companies.  
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Apart from that, another aspect worthwhile looking at in the context of liquidity is the 
cash conversion cycle. Since SBP companies interact with various suppliers on one end 
and numerous customers on the other end of the supply chain, they need to watch out 
for the time span they need to convert investments into cash-flows. Powerful SBP 
companies might carry this to a degree where they can extent their payables period to 
suppliers and hence even obtain a type of temporary cash credit which might allow them 
to take on additional business opportunities until they pay to suppliers.   
 
IV.2 Capital or Asset-Intensive Industries Sector 
Distribution of factor weights for Capital and Asset-Intensive Sector: 
 
Capital and Asset Intensive 
   
Rating Factors Sub-Factors Weighting 
Scale  10% 
 Revenue 10% 
   
Business Profile  35% 
 Industry & Country Risk 
 Market Characteristics 5% 
 Expected Growth 5% 
 Exogenous Factors 3% 
 Company Risk 
 Competitive Profile 5% 
 Operating Efficiency 7% 
 Geographic Diversification 5% 
 Business Segments 5% 
   
Financial Profile  40% 
 Debt / EBITDA 10% 
 EBITDA / Interest Expense 8% 
 RCF / Net Debt 7% 
 FCF / Debt 7% 
 EBITDA Margin 8% 
   
Financial Policy   15% 
 Management Quality 5% 
 Capital Structure 6% 
 Liquidity & Payout Policy 4% 
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1.) Scale (10%) 
Scale as measured by business volume plays an important role for capital and asset-intensive 
(CAI) firms in determining their creditworthiness. It is directly related to volatility in the 
amount of sales and the pricing of the products offered.  
For CAI companies, fluctuation in revenues is mainly bound to general economic conditions. 
Growth or decline in GDP, trade volumes and per capita wealth directly influence revenue 
streams that companies can realize. Length and depth of economic cycles may vary by product 
though with some being more reactive than others, mainly depending on how essential goods 
are to consumers. A common way to smooth out revenue streams is generating order backlogs 
instead of temporarily adjusting production capacity which is costly and might lie idle in times 
of market downturns. 
Prices from the sale of products underlie the price setting power of the respective firm. 
Whenever a firm has a portfolio of innovative products that are based on disruptive production 
techniques or protected by patents and thus hard to copy, it may charge a price premium. On 
the contrary, companies who offer generic products will try to attract customers by low prices 
which will squeeze margins. 
 
2.) Business Profile 
Industry Risk (13%): 
• Market Characteristics 5%: Demand for products of CAI industries depend on the 
characteristics of the product portfolio. Product portfolios typically run through a 
lifecycle with high demand in initiation phases when products are perceived to be 
innovative and no substitutes are available on markets. Products then gradually mature 
with demand declining over time until they become obsolete and are replaced by new 
product versions. The longer a product lifecycle, the more stable demand for a company 
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will be. If a firm has certain blockbuster products in its portfolio, they can cover the 
major part of overall demand.  
• Expected growth 5%: Industry growth is mainly aligned with overall GDP growth. 
Some firms may realize exceptional growth due to product innovation and patents which 
allow them to over-proportionally capture market share. On the downside, growth may 
be dampened by patent expiration and cannibalism effects from substitute products of 
competitors.  
• Exogenous Factors 3%: Exogenous factors play a minor role for the CAI industry. 
Government regulation considering safety standards of products and production 
techniques should still be mentioned. However, they are mainly foreseeable and should 
hence not impact corporate creditworthiness to a large extent.  
Company Risk (17%): 
• Competitive Profile 5%: Companies acting within the CAI industry do not differentiate 
themselves too much along factors like brand identity or marketing campaigns. What 
really sets one company apart from the other is product quality, degree of innovation, 
technological advance and superior production expertise. Companies who do not 
dispose of any of these competitive advantages will only remain in markets by offering 
a better price than competitors which at the same time stresses margins and forces them 
to operate extremely cost-efficient.  
• Operating efficiency 7%: Operating efficiency is of utmost importance for companies 
of the CAI industry in light of the considerable level of cost that they incur in order to 
be able to operate. Namely, there are high expenses in R&D which guarantee a constant 
flow of innovation and technological progress. Furthermore, as the name of this industry 
suggests, it is characterized by substantial spending on fixed production assets, be it for 
purchase of plants, machinery and equipment or their subsequent maintenance and 
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refurbishment. In this context, CAI companies need to realize economies of scale and 
scope, to spread fixed cost across higher production volumes. The bigger these 
companies grow or the stronger their position is for the production of one particular 
product, the easier economies of scale are to be obtained. Companies not being able to 
manufacture and distribute cost-efficiently will the sooner or later not be able to service 
high loads of fixed cost that the nature of their business implies.  
Another aspect to be mentioned is CAI firms’ dependence on input prices from raw 
materials. Operational efficiency will also depend on their ability to pass increases in 
raw material prices on to end consumers. Due to the high importance of operational 
efficiency in several perspectives, we assign a weight of 7%.  
• Geographic Diversification 5%: For CAI businesses, geographic diversification is an 
important means of lowering potential risks. Being present in different international 
markets diversifies the origins of the customer base which may smooth out fluctuation 
in revenue (e.g. downturn in product demand in North America and Western Europe is 
off-set with rising demand from emerging market countries). Nevertheless, there is also 
a certain downside potential stemming from geographic diversification: there may be 
currency mismatches between production countries where costs are incurred and target 
market countries where products are sold to.  
• Business Segment Diversification 5%: Business segment diversification is beneficial for 
CAI companies as it reduces dependency on revenue streams from one single product 
type. A company may suddenly lose market share in one product segment because 
competitors managed to creating entry barriers through large capital expenditures in 
enhanced machinery or through application of patents after successful completion of 
R&D processes. Being diversified across segments might mitigate the risk of being 
caught by these scenarios. On the downside, diversifying across various capital-
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intensive business segments once again raises funding requirements and subsequent 
interest down-payments. Hence, benefits should be weighted carefully against 
additional cost arising from it.  
 
3.) Financial Profile  
• Debt/EBITDA 10%: CAI companies require a lot of capital to fund their operations. It 
is hence indicative of their financial stability to look at a leverage ratio like 
Debt/EBITDA in order to get a sense of the proportion of debt funding to operating 
income which is used to finance debt loads. 
• EBITDA/Interest Expense 8%: This coverage ratio reveals the relation of operational 
income before non-cash expenses for depreciation and amortization to interest expenses 
that have been incurred to finance operations. It is worthwhile looking at for CAI 
companies due to their high capital requirements. Using EBITDA instead of EBIT is 
considered useful in credit analysis to avoid distortions in the assessment of debt 
repayment capacity since depreciation and amortization do not represent any real cash 
outflows. 
• RCF/Net Debt 7%: Retained cash flow adds back capital expenditures and changes in 
working capital to free-cash flow and hence reveals how much proceeds from operations 
a company has left to service debt payments. It is useful for the assessment of CAI 
companies, since it allows for judging corporate solvency before any investments in 
fixed assets are made and keeps this term flexible with regard to credit risk exposure. If 
the company perceives the ratio to be at a critical level, it may defer expenditures in 
fixed assets to the next period to retain more cash for debt repayment. 
• FCF/Net Debt 7%: Free cash flow is calculated as operating cash flow less capital 
expenditures which are incurred to expand or maintain the asset base. In relation to net 
debt, it indicates the ratio between the remainder of cash that is free to be paid to 
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investors and the total debt amount raised by the company. It is informative for CAI 
industries since capital expenditures which make up the difference between operating 
and free cash flow are substantial.  
• EBITDA Margin 8%: EBITDA margin is meaningful in determining how efficient a 
company is in cutting down operational cost and realizing economies of scale. As 
described in the “Business Profile” factor, operational efficiency is highly important for 
CAI companies and decisive for their level of financial stability. Hence, EBITDA 
margin appears as a useful metric to measure the level of accomplishment of this factor 
and therefore carries a weight of 8%. 
 
4.) Financial Policy 
 
• Management Quality 5%: The primary challenge for management of CAI companies is 
dealing with their capital intensity. Management has to be able to decide upon the 
amount and timing of investments into the fixed asset base and to judge which expansion 
projects to take on and which ones to forego. Oftentimes, these decisions are complex 
and require a lot of industry-specific knowledge and expertise.  
Moreover, management constantly has to be vigilant about the cost efficiency of 
operation processes and needs to find ways how to further cut down cost and increase 
economies of scale without compromising product quality.  
• Capital Structure 6%: Apart from cost-efficient operations, decisions considering 
sources of financing are as well important to ensure a sustainable solvency situation at 
all times. Because of their capital intensity, CAI firms should dispose of easy access to 
either debt or equity capital markets at reasonable cost. For the debt portion in CAI 
firms’ capital structure, special caution has to be exercised with regard to interest 
payments due to the volatility present in revenue streams and profitability margins 
which may affect timely fulfilment of these obligations.  
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• Liquidity 4%: Having considered capital intensity as a driver of credit risk in the 
previous factors, there are also instances in which it can be helpful. If a firm is in extreme 
financial distress, it can opt for liquidation of a part of its asset base to raise the level of 
cash which is available to service debt payments. Companies with a large asset base can 
do this with ease whereas companies that primarily rely on intangible inputs for their 
operations struggle to do so.  
Apart from that, aspects of liquidity that matter for CAI firms are an adequate cash 
conversion circle as well as a decent cash buffer for interest payments that come due in 
the near-term future. 
Since we perceive the biggest impact on credit risk stemming from capital intensity and 
the resultant level of leverage, we assign a 6% weight to “Capital Structure” and a 4% 
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IV.3 Pure Commodity Industries Sector 
Distribution of factor weights for Pure Commodity Industries Sector: 
Pure Commodity 
   
Rating Factors Sub-Factors Weighting 
Scale  10% 
 Revenue 10% 
   
Business Profile  35% 
 Industry & Country Risk 
 Market Characteristics 6% 
 Expected Growth 3% 
 Exogenous Factors 5% 
 Company Risk 
 Competitive Profile 4% 
 Operating Efficiency 7% 
 Geographic Diversification 4% 
 Business Segments 6% 
   
Financial Profile  40% 
 Debt / EBITDA 10% 
 EBITDA / Interest Expense 9% 
 RCF / Net Debt 7% 
 FCF / Debt 6% 
 EBITDA Margin 8% 
   
Financial Policy   15% 
 Management Quality 4% 
 Capital Structure 6% 
 Liquidity & Payout Policy 5% 
 
 
1.) Scale Factor (10%) 
Scale assesses the impact of a commodity firm’s business volume on its exposure to credit risk. 
The scale of corporate revenues is determined by the quantity of sales and by prices that can be 
charged from customers. Commodity firms are subject to volatility in sales volumes which is 
due to both, seasonal ups and downs on the short-run and co-movement with the general 
economic cycle on the long-run. This can be explained by the fact that commodity goods 
represent primary inputs for manufacturing and production industries and hence depend on 
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volume contractions and expansions in those markets which also typically move alongside 
overall macroeconomic conditions.  
Prices as well tend to be volatile, mainly because of competitive price pressures on the one hand 
and sudden, unexpected supply shortages on the other hand. The latter happens whenever 
exogenous factors like e.g. natural impacts (droughts, diseases) or government regulation (trade 
restrictions) decreases the amount of commodity goods traded in markets. Prices will 
subsequently jump for a short period of time until customers will walk away to substitute 
products. The presence of volatility in both, sales volumes and prices, makes us assign a 10% 
weight to the scale factor as we would like to account for the instability of revenue streams and 
the resulting impact on credit risk exposure.  
 
2.) Business Profile 
Industry Risk (18%): 
• Market Characteristics 6%: Demand in commodity markets tends to be very cyclical 
and is mainly driven by the overall state of industries which use commodities as raw 
material input for production. Pure commodity firms which are particularly prone to 
cyclical fluctuation are the ones delivering raw materials to the construction industry. 
Producers of fossil fuels like crude oil will as well notice changes in the state of the 
global economy since their product is input to almost all (energy-consuming) 
manufacturing processes. On the opposite, food-producing commodity firms see less 
cyclicality in demand because they provide production inputs for non-discretionary 
products which will also be consumed in times of recession.  
• Expected Growth 3%: Opportunities for growth are limited on the single company level, 
at least in the short-run. This is due to the high price pressure which depresses margins 
and profitability. Furthermore, it is difficult for one company to stand out from the 
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others because differentiation potential is limited. As a consequence, firms will grow 
alongside overall economic growth and barely surpass this benchmark.  
• Exogenous Factors 6%: There is a range of factors that can impact commodity firms’ 
operations and cash flows which lie beyond their scope of influence. These factors can 
either have a natural origin like droughts, floods or storms, all of them being able to 
diminish harvest or destroy natural resources that can be offered on markets. 
Alternatively, they can be rooted in politics, like e.g. trade restrictions or environmental 
regulations, both having the potential to affect revenue streams and operational cost. 
We assign a 5% weight to this factor to reflect its high-risk impact on firm’s financial 
health and creditworthiness.  
Company Risk (14%): 
• Competitive Profile 3%: As their name suggests, commodity businesses provide 
commoditized goods which are characterized by their low potential to be differentiated 
from one another. As a result, firms have very little scope to retain clients other than by 
providing the cheapest price possible. If they try to offer their goods at a premium, 
clients will switch to competitors as the perceived quality of the product does not differ 
across suppliers. Marketing or branding efforts do not create any value added since they 
are not considered important for commodity goods by the average customer and will 
hence not lead to higher switching cost.  
• Operational Efficiency 7%: Operational efficiency is of great importance for 
commodity firms since their only measure to increase margins is proper cost 
management. Optimal capacity utilization and economies of scale are two ways how 
operational efficiency can be improved. If a commodity firm is good at realizing 
economies of scale, it might grow large and consequently gains competitive advantage 
and drives competitors out of the market. Disposing of good vertical integration is 
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another factor which may add to operational efficiency. Vertical integration is the extent 
to which a commodity firm is linked with its successors in the supply chain. For 
example, strategic geographic positioning in close reach to manufacturers cuts down 
distribution cost and creates advantages over competitors from outside the region. Since 
operational efficiency is the only real lever a commodity firm has at hand to increase 
margins and create entry barriers, we assign a weight of 7% to this factor. 
• Geographic Diversification 4%: For commodity firms, we see geographic 
diversification as being closely interrelated with exogenous factors as diversifying 
across countries reduces the risk of being caught adversely by one of the events 
described in this model factor. Hence, a commodity form which operates in different 
countries may be better off in comparison to a business which concentrates operations 
to one single market. Nonetheless, geographic diversification also introduces riskiness 
of operations and business processes, which is especially true for commodity firms 
because their operations frequently take place on emerging market countries.  
• Business Segment Diversification 6%: Here again, diversifying across different 
commodities segments might limit adverse effects from exogenous factors. In addition 
to that, business segment diversification can also increase product differentiation and 
vertical integration every time a commodity firm accomplishes to offer value-added 
products or services which would actually belong to the product range of aftermarket 
business segments. Adding features to their product offering may lead to higher pricing 
power, enhanced client retention rates and a competitive advantage over competitors. 
Due to this opportunity of mutually lowering risk and differentiating business profiles, 
we assign a weight of 6%to business segment diversification.  
All in all, we see credit risk for commodity firms to be driven more by market-wide than by 
firm-specific conditions and hence over-weight the first factor. 
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3.) Financial Profile 
• Debt/EBITDA 10%: Commodity firms’ business model brings along a lot of funding 
requirements for machinery, plants and production sites. As a result, businesses are 
usually highly levered. A leverage ratio like debt-to-EBITDA should thus be followed 
closely to get a sense of the firm’s ability to service debt payments by what it generates 
through operations. This is particularly the case as revenue streams have the potential 
to fluctuate substantially over time, introducing riskiness to the debt service capacity. 
• EBITDA/Interest Expense 9%: As described earlier, cost management is essential to 
secure income from operations as there is little possibility to adjust prices. Interest 
expenses will then be paid for from what is left of proceeds from operations. EBITDA 
coverage ratio transmits a good picture of a firm’s efficiency in doing so. EBITDA is 
preferred over EBIT since non-cash expenses for commodity firms are essential and 
their exclusion might lead to a distorted picture of a firm’s ability to pay for its debt.  
• RCF/Net Debt 7%: Retained cash-flow as cash-flow before changes in working capital 
and capital expenditures delivers a good indicator of the firm’s initial position before 
making any investment decisions. Being set in relation to debt, it is indicative of 
commodity firms’ ability to service interest payments before making re-investment into 
property, plants and equipment which is substantial in this sector. It is helpful in drawing 
conclusions about whether investments into the asset base can be carried out without 
putting the firm at risk of financial instability or whether they should rather be deferred 
to another point in time.  
• FCF/Debt 6%: Free cash-flow which is operating cash-flow less capital expenditures 
reveals how much money is essentially left on the table to pay for debt obligations. 
Relative to total debt, it delivers an immediate impression of a firm’s financial health.  
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• EBITDA Margin 8%: EBITDA margin indicates very well how efficient a firm manages 
its operating cost. Since this aspect is crucial in the context of commodity firms, this 
ratio has high informative value for the financial soundness of commodity firms and 
counts with a weight of 8%. 
 
4.) Financial Policy 
• Management Quality 4%: As previously mentioned, there is little potential for product 
differentiation in the pure commodity sector. Going one step further, this can be exactly 
seen as the point where management quality kicks in. Where product features do not 
create switching cost, long-tenured, strong supply relationships with manufacturers can 
even more do so. Furthermore, prudent cost management just as coping with volatility 
in sales volumes and prices require a lot of executive skill. 
• Capital Structure 6%: Commodity businesses are highly capital-intensive. Initial 
outlays to start operations are huge and reinvestment into fixed assets is substantial. In 
the majority of cases, these conditions require funding raised from debt capital markets 
and banks. In combination with high volatility in revenue streams and stressed 
profitability due to low margins, this may create risks in the context of corporate 
solvency. Hence, commodity firms need to be considerate about the relation of what 
they own to what they owe not to surpass the limit where they are no longer able to 
service the payments arising from their debt loads. Debt investor’s risk of investing in 
commodity firm’s securities is however oftentimes limited as they are backed by the 
vast asset base which serves as collateral.  
• Liquidity Management 5%: Here again, it needs to me mentioned that commodity firms 
are subject to sudden fluctuations in business volumes and prices that they might not 
foresee. Disposing of a comfortable liquidity cushion seems to be a reasonable measure 
to answer to these challenges, also in light of the fact that most commodity firms count 
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with substantial interest payments that they have to service, no matter if revenues are 
flowing in the current period, or not.  
Furthermore, a balance sheet caption that has to be closely followed is accounts 
receivables since commodity firms have only limited ability to off-set them with 
account payables due to their positioning in the supply chain (they deliver goods to a lot 
of customers but barely purchase inputs where they could delay payment). Commodity 




IV.4 National Industries & Utilities Sector 
Distribution of factor weights for National Industries & Utilities Sector: 
National Industries & Utilities 
   
Rating Factors Sub-Factors Weighting 
Scale  5% 
 Revenues 5% 
   
Business Profile  35% 
 Industry Risk 
 Market Characteristics 4% 
 Expected Growth 4% 
 Exogenous Factors 8% 
 Company Risk 
 Competitive Profile 4% 
 Operating Efficiency 8% 
 Geographic Diversification       3% 
 Business Segments       4% 
   
Financial Profile  45% 
 Debt / EBITDA 13% 
 EBITDA / Interest Expense 11% 
 RCF / Net Debt 8% 
 FCF / Debt 7% 
 EBITDA Margin 6% 
   
Financial Policy   15% 
 Management Quality 5% 
 Capital Structure 6% 
 Liquidity & Payout Policy 4% 
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1.) Scale Factor (5%) 
The first model factor “Scale” is intended to assess the credit strength of an entity according to 
its business volume as measured by revenue. National industries and utilities (NI&U) provide 
infrastructure services which are goods of everyday use that are essential to the society as a 
whole. As a result, this sector’s customer base is broad by definition. Furthermore, NI&U act 
under government regulation which oftentimes enables them to position themselves as 
predominant force in entire markets and protects them from competitors who might take over 
market share. Considering the price setting process, NI&U have high pricing power due to their 
monopoly-like status. Governments frequently influence the price setting process by 
determining tariffs that need to be charged from customers. Overall, these conditions lead to 
mostly reliable revenue streams for the NI&U sector. We hence assign a weight of 5% to reflect 
a limited impact stemming from the scale factor onto the overall credit risk exposure.  
 
1.) Business Profile  
Industry Risk (16%): 
• Market Characteristics 4%: Demand for NI&U’s infrastructure services is reasonably 
stable due to their positioning as non-discretionary goods.  It is not subject to cyclicality 
meaning that it is resistant to economic cycles and exhibits low price elasticity. 
Consequently, this factor feeds into the overall rating assignment at a weight of 4%.  
• Expected Growth 4%: NI&U companies are said to have limited growth potential at 
least in the short-run. Growth is mainly determined by a change in size of the customer 
base (e.g. through demographics or fluctuations on housing markets). Another indicator 
might be GDP growth as a measure of overall economic activity which allows for 
drawing conclusions about the general need for infrastructure services.  
• Exogenous Factors 8%: The NI&U sector is heavily influenced by exogenous factors, 
namely government interventions, regulatory regimes, tariffs and taxation. Companies 
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are not able to shape these impacts, they can only anticipate and react to new rules 
imposed on them. Their ability to cope with regulation and policies has a high impact 
on their solvency and liquidity situation. To give an example, they might be required to 
fulfill environmentally motivated operating restrictions which oftentimes come at high 
investment requirements in order to be met. Due to exogenous factors’ potential to affect 
the financial situation of a firm substantially, we assign a weight of 8%. 
• Competitive Profile 4%: NI&U companies have limited capacity to differentiate 
themselves from competitors due to the nature of goods and services they provide. 
Brand strength and marketing efforts have a minor role in their business models. At the 
same time, there is also no real need for concerns about this factor since NI&U 
companies are broadly shielded from other firms accessing the market because of 
government regulation. Henceforth, we assign a weight of 4%.  
• Operating Efficiency 8%: Efficient operations are of great importance to NI&U firms. 
They need to be in control of their operating cost because of their limited power to adjust 
prices on the one hand and because of their capital intensity and high leverage on the 
other hand. The latter will require them to make substantial expenditures for 
maintenance and expansion of their asset base as well as for the fulfillment of interest 
expenses. A weight of 8% proved to be adequate to account for the importance of 
operating efficiency for this sector.  
• Geographic Diversification 3%: NI&U companies do not count with any geographic 
diversification by nature of their business. In most cases, they act amid the influence of 
a municipality’s political and regulatory impact and serve local markets. It is hence the 
risk assessment for one single location and the lack of geographic diversification 
opportunities that will translate into a rating for this factor which obtains a weight of 
3%. 
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• Business Segment Diversification 4%: Just as geographic diversification, business 
segment diversification tends to be limited to non-existent for NI&U companies. This 
can translate into increased riskiness for a business given that unfavourable conditions 
in one segment cannot be offset with benefits from another one.  
 
2.) Financial Profile 
• Debt/EBITDA 13%: One decisive feature of NI&U companies is their high level of 
leverage. They require high level of debt financing to fund capital expenditures their 
business models impose on them. Debt/EBITDA as a leverage ratio is thus an important 
ratio to get a sense of what the proportion of fixed claims on the company is in relation 
to the proceeds it generated by its operations, non-cash expenses still being included.  
• EBITDA/interest expense 11%: This coverage ratio allows for an assessment of the 
company’s ability to service interest payments by what it generates through operations. 
The better the cost management the company has in place, the more will be left over to 
fulfill interest payments.  
• RCF/Net Debt 8%: Retained cash flow is the residual available to be invested into the 
asset base and new projects or to be maintained as a buffer for future payment of 
obligations. Being set into relation with net debt, it is a good indicator of overall 
financial health for the near-term future.   
• FCF/Debt 7%: Free cash-flow as operating cash flow less capital investments into fixed 
assets and cash flow to fund financing reflects the cash that remains to be pay for interest 
obligations and to reduce debt loads. 
• EBITDA margin 6%: EBITDA margin accounts for the ability to manage cost and 
realize economies of scale, both of which will ultimately turn into higher margins. As 
explained before, these are crucial considerations for NI&U companies, due to their 
limited pricing power.  
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Generally, we perceive solvency measures being orientated at capturing the firm’s ability 
to deal with its level of leverage over the longer-term future to be more relevant for the 
assessment of financial soundness of NI&U firms than short-term cash flow coverage ratios. 
The rationale behind is that governments will back up NI&U firms with new capital 
injections given a sudden liquidity shortage. They effectively act as an insurance against 
credit risk exposure on the short-run. Consequently, the first two ratios impact the rating 
assessment at a higher weight than the second two ratios.   
 
3.) Financial Policy 
• Management Quality 5%: Management’s skill and prudence is key for NI&U firms. 
They need to be able to handle investment in capital assets, high leverage levels and the 
need for effective cost management on the operating level. On top of that, they 
encounter frequent interaction and intervention by government and regulators who they 
need to maintain good relations with.  
• Capital Structure 6%: As already mentioned, NI&U companies rely on debt financing 
as a major part of their funding sources. They hence do not dispose of the flexibility that 
equity financing provides in terms of investor compensation but they need to be able to 
pay for interest expenses in a timely manner. Nevertheless, their risk exposure is limited 
in a sense that the government will back up NI&U companies in case they cannot meet 
interest obligations. 
• Liquidity 4%: NI&U companies need a reliable liquidity buffer to pay for their 
substantial interest obligations which come due on a regular basis. Relatively stable 
revenues do favour the availability of cash. However, NI&U firms are expected to make 
regular dividend payouts to shareholders which effectively lowers the level of cash 
retained in the company. The rationale behind is that stocks of utility firms are broadly 
perceived to be value investments by equity investors. Reluctance or inability of NI&U 
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firms to pay out dividends might discourage them to keep their funds invested which 







Model Test for Active & Defaulted companies 
 
In order to test the new model on precision and consistency of results, we took eight companies 
of Banco Invest’s portfolio and four companies that defaulted in the Iberian market in the last 
10 years. Selection criteria for the defaulted companies were comparability to the active 
companies in terms of business profile and assignability to one of the four industry sectors. The 
final test sample is as follows:  
Pure Commodity Sector: 
• Sovena Oilseed Portugal: Subsidiary of Sovena Group; refines, produces and distributes 
vegetable and olive oil internationally. 
• Galp Energía: Portuguese company comprising business activities in the natural gas 
and petroleum supply, exploration, production, regasification, transportation, storage, 
and distribution sector.  
• SA Hullera Vasco Leonesa: It was a Spanish coal mining company that was founded in 
1893 and defaulted in 2014. It operated in the metal and mining industry. 
 
National Industries & Utilities Sector: 
• Electricidade dos Açores: Electric utilities company belonging to the National 
Industries and Utilities sector that operates on the Azores islands. 
• Empresa de Electricidade da Madeira: Portuguese electric energy utilities company 
founded in 1974.  
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• Autopista de la Costa Cálida: the company was constituted in 2004 and filed for 
bankruptcy in 2012. It was responsible for construction and maintenance of the highway 
that connects the Spanish regions of Andalucía and Murcia.  
 
Capital and Asset-intensive Industries Sector: 
• Hovione Farmaciencia: Pharmaceutical company which is headquartered in Portugal 
and operates worldwide.  
• COLEP Portugal: Leading Portuguese player in the global consumer goods packaging 
and contract manufacturing industry. 
• Islas Airways: Was an airline based in Tenerife that offered passenger transportation 
services around the Canary Islands. It was founded in 2002 and defaulted in 2011. 
 
Services and Branded Products Industries Sector: 
• Jerónimo Martins: Portuguese group operating in the business and consumer services 
industry with leadership positions in the retailer market in Portugal and Poland.  
• Dufry AG: Swiss-based travel retailer that operates duty-free shops in airports located 
in more than 64 countries worldwide.  
• Imtech Spain Sociedad Limitada: Offered software technology services to different 
companies in the industrial sector; started operations in 2001 and went bankrupt in 
January 2017.  
 
The purpose of the test is to demonstrate that our rating model is able to capture credit risk 
exposure at least as precisely as the initial Banco Invest model. To prove this statement, we 
estimated rating scores for all of the abovementioned companies using our own model as well 
as the original Banco Invest model. We repeated this procedure for the last three years of 
available company data to control for deviations attributable to non-recurring events. 
Comparing both models’ results allows us to look into possible origins of divergences.   
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Our evaluation criteria for the quality and precision of the new model were 1) to obtain ratings 
for the bankrupted companies that fall into a rating notch that reflects proximity to default; 2) 
to derive ratings for the defaulted companies that were equal to slightly lower than the Banco 
Invest ratings to confirm that our model returns prudent and rather conservative rating scores 
and does not underestimate default risk; 3) to obtain ratings for active companies that were as 
close as possible to Banco Invest’s scores.  
Whenever there was a lack of information to carry out the qualitative analysis required in the 
“Business Profile” factor, we have transmitted the rating score of the previous to the following 
period. This was especially the case for the defaulted companies because little information had 
been published in the year of their bankruptcies. For the “Financial Policy” factor, we decided 
to assign a fixed rating score of 3 whenever information was completely absent. Nonetheless, 
we do not consider this adjustments to largely affect the rating outcomes since qualitative factor 
assessments tend to be rather static in the short-run and influenced by the company’s business 
activities of immediately preceding years.  
After conducting the factor assessment and subsequent match with the adequate rating notch 
on the respective scorecards, we discussed the resulting ratings with all the group members in 
order to reduce subjectivity of the assessment.  
 
 
V.1 Test Outcomes 
When utilized in the tests, the new model showed a good rating results across all sectors. It 
met our criteria of being slightly lower than Banco Invests’ rating scores for the defaulted 
companies and therefore confirms an adequate level of prudency and conservatism for our 
assessment approach. For the active companies, our model revealed to work out better for 
some sectors than for others. In the majority of cases we obtain rating scores close to the ones 
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of Banco Invest which we deem as an indicator for its practicability. In the following, we will 
compare rating outcomes sector by sector. 
For the pure commodity sector test of the defaulted company, Banco Invest’s model returns 
higher rating scores than the new model in all of the three years analysed. The maximum 
difference between the two models is 0.69 for the defaulted company. The difference can be 
traced back to the Business Profile factor, where the values of market share (7) and 
technology position (7) in the original model are considerably higher. We account for them in 
a different way in our model because we focus more on the effect of operational efficiency (5) 
which does not yield good results for the tested company. Moreover, there is a gap of 0.64 in 
the Financial Profile factor, which is explained by the different allocation of weights for each 
ratio and the definition of a sector specific scorecard table.  
Likewise, in case of non-defaulted companies, the bank model returned higher rating scores 
for each year with a maximum difference of 0.41 for Galp Energia, in the first year, and 0.47 
for Sovena Oilseeds Portugal S.A. in the third year. At first sight, the new model seems to 
overestimate credit risk exposure in case of Galp Energia, while there is little evidence in 
Sovena Oilseeds Portugal.  Nevertheless, it has to be taken into account that deviations may 
come from subjectivity in the assessment of the qualitative factors and that testing three 
companies may not pose a representative data sample after all.  
 
Company Model Y Y-1 Y-2 
Pure Commodity Macro Sector 
Galp Energia 
Banco Invest 7.00 6.60 6.20 
Nova SBE 6.59 6.25 5.93 
Difference 0.41 0.35 0.27 
 
    
SA Hullera Vasco     
Leonessa 
Banco Invest 3.35 3.35 6.80 
Nova SBE 3.15 3.27 6.11 
Difference 0.20 0.08 0.69 
 
    
Sovena Oilseeds        
Portugal S.A. 
Banco Invest 6.30 6.65 6.25 
Nova SBE 6.13 6.49 5.78 
Difference 0.17 0.16 0.47 
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With regard to the Capital and Asset-Intensive sector model, the spread between model 
outcomes for active companies tends to be slightly higher for Hovione Farmaciencia, with a 
maximum difference of 0.58, and smaller for Colep with a maximum difference of 0.28. For 
Hovione, the difference is explained by the financial profile rating (3.53 for our model and 4.5 
for Banco Invest) and by the effect of the 10%-weight for the Scale factor that is only rated at 
a score of 3. For Colep, the origins of divergence were the same. However, we think that 
weighting the Scale-factor at 10% is well justified by our industry analysis and henceforth, we 
did not opt for changing it.  
Considering the test of the defaulted company, the new model again returns the lowest rating 
score amongst the three companies tested with a maximum difference of 0.56 three years before 
bankruptcy. The difference is equally distributed between the business profile (2.10 of Banco 
Invest versus 1.81) and financial profile (0.98 of the proposal model against the 1.40 of the 
bank’s). 
 
Company Model Y Y-1 Y-2 
Capital or Asset Intensive Macro Sector 
Hovione Farmaciencia SA 
Banco Invest 8.05 8.05 7.55 
Nova SBE 7.47 7.54 7.40 
Difference 0.58 0.51 0.15 
 
    
Islas Airways 
Banco Invest 3.65 3.85 4.00 
Nova SBE 3.20 3.71 3.44 
Difference 0.45 0.14 0.56 
 
    
Colep Portugal SA 
Banco Invest 6.45 6.10 6.25 
Nova SBE 6.40 5.86 5.97 
Difference 0.05 0.24 0.28 
 
 
When testing Services and Branded Products industries, we obtained good results for the new 
model. It returned very close results in one non-defaulted company and a lower rating for the 
bankrupted company. While for Dufry, both of the models obtained more or less the same 
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rating, for Jeronimo Martins the original model constantly delivered higher ratings with a 
maximum difference of 0.37. This time the divergence can only be traced back to differences 
in the assessment of profitability while for all other factors, we obtained the same rating values 
as Banco Invest.  
Differences in ratings for Imtech Spain are pretty consistent, with a maximum difference of 
0.32 and a minimum difference of 0.27. According to the new model, the company obtains low 
ratings in Business Segment (5) and Operating Efficiency (5), variables that the previous model 
does not take into account in the same way. Considering the rating outcomes, our new model 
would lead to a slight downgrade in ratings and could hence overstate default risk. 
 
Company Model Y Y-1 Y-2 
Services & Branded Products Macro Sector 
Jerònimo Martins SGPS 
Banco Invest 8.90 8.90 8.75 
Nova SBE 8.65 8.53 8.53 
Difference 0.25 0.37 0.22 
 
    
Imtech Spain Sociedad 
Limitada 
Banco Invest 3.75 3.75 3.80 
Nova SBE 3.43 3.43 3.53 
Difference 0.32 0.32 0.27 
 
    
Dufry AG 
Banco Invest 6.65 6.45 6.6 
Nova SBE 6.66 6.58 6.66 
Difference -0.01 -0.13 -0.06 
 
 
For the National Industries and Utilities sector, the picture is different: we obtain remarkably 
higher ratings with the new model than with Banco Invest’s original model. The reason might 
lie in the new weights and the scorecards that were adjusted for the Business Profile and 
Financial Profile factor. In particular, we describe the effects of exogenous factors, leverage, 
financial coverage and profitability in closer detail as when compared to Banco Invests model. 
It could be that in this way, our model is more able to account for beneficial effects from the 
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monopoly-like status of this industry, the option for government aid in times of financial 
distress and relative price stability.  
Surprisingly, this result is not confirmed for the assessment of the defaulted company. In 
contrast, our model delivers more prudent ratings here, reflecting a higher probability of default. 
In conjunction, this could be seen as evidence that our model is able to capture financial distress 
whenever it is present, but is also not too restrictive for companies that are financially sound. 
 
 
Company Model Y Y-1 Y-2 
National Industries & Utilities Macro Sector 
Eletricidade Dos Acores SA 
Banco Invest 6.75 6.6 6.2 
Nova SBE 7.26 7.18 7.18 
Difference -0.51 -0.58 -0.98 
 
    
Autopista De La Costa 
Calida 
Banco Invest 3.25 3.25 3.75 
Nova SBE 2.99 2.99 3.90 
Difference 0.26 0.26 -0.15 
 
    
Empresa de electricidade da 
Madeira 
Banco Invest 5.65 5.7 5.55 
Nova SBE 6.35 6.51 6.45 
Difference -0.70 -0.81 -0.90 
 
 
In conclusion, the previous tests show three main aspects: 1) no apparent evidence of over- or 
underestimation of credit risk, or at least not persistent along the sector models; 2) in most of 
the cases, the model complies with our self-imposed quality criteria obtaining lower ratings for 
defaulted companies and close values for active companies when compared to Banco Invest’s 
results and 3) the new credit risk model seems to fit better for some sectors than others. 
Nonetheless, as previously mentioned, these tests were performed under various restrictions 
and assumptions. In order to obtain more representative results, it seems recommendable to 
repeat the tests with a bigger company sample in order to adjust and reduce the distortion effect 
caused by the assumptions. 
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VI 
Probability of Default Assessment 
 
After having introduced our own credit rating model, we would now like to turn to the 
presentation of several statistical approaches for the estimation of probability of default 
measures (PD). Credit rating models deliver implied PD which are derived from observing 
historical defaults that actually occurred across the pool of rated companies.  Nevertheless, 
economic research has come up with many alternatives to mathematically determine the PD. 
Namely there are linear regression models, discriminant analysis models, logit and probit 
models, neural networks and classification trees.  
The main motivation behind the application of mathematical approaches is twofold: obviously, 
there is an urge to determine the probability of default as reliably as possible in order to avoid 
conceding credit to “bad debtors”. Mathematically motivated models may do better in this 
context than credit rating models because they are purely objective based on numbers. They 
leave out every subjectivity stemming from human assessment which credit rating models rely 
on a lot as we have seen with the two models discussed earlier. The second reason is that credit 
rating agencies tend to focus on large, publicly traded corporations. Hence, the need has been 
arising to create PD models that are able to also rate small to medium-sized, non-public 
companies which are not followed by CRAs.  
We will present two models in closer detail, Altman’s Z-Score and a logistic regression model. 
We chose these models because they are perfectly suitable for the company set at hand and lie 
within the range of computations that we can perform. Commonly used approaches that we 
could not apply was Moody’s KMV model which uses proprietary data to match the so-called 
distance-to-default with PD. Referring back to observable market prices of credit default swaps, 
bonds and options to derive the implied PD was also not possible for the entire company set 
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since a lot of the companies are not publicly listed. Hence, we have limited ourselves to Z-score 
and logistic regression models which we will describe in the following.  
  
 
VI.1 Altman’s Z-score 
The first credit scoring model of its kind was developed by NYU professor Edward Altman in 
1968. It was based on a sample of 66 traded U.S. manufacturing companies which all filed for 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy according to U.S. federal law. Altman matched these companies with 
survivor firms that coincided in terms of industry and size in order to prevent the model from 
delivering biased results. He subsequently applied a statistical method called discriminant 
analysis which led to the linear combination of four or five common financial ratios and a 
threshold value (so-called Z-score). The concept of discriminant analysis was developed by 
Fisher (1936) and aims at predicting one categorical dependent variable through the use of one 
or more independent variables. 
The ratios are determined in a way that they minimize type I and type II errors in loan decisions. 
A type I error occurs when a loan is conceded to a bad debtor; a type II error consists in denying 
credit to a good debtor. The variables selected for the original Z-score model were: 
• working capital / total assets (measures changes in current assets in relation to company 
size; for distressed firm this ratio typically turns negative, as current liabilities surpass 
current assets) 
• retained earnings / total assets (measure of cumulative profitability summing up all 
earnings that were reinvested into the company and sets them in relation to assets used 
to generate them) 
• EBIT / total assets (measures operating efficiency and productivity ignoring effects from 
taxes and financing decisions; the higher the ratio, the higher productivity) 
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• market value of equity / book value of total liabilities (measures the relationship between 
what a firm owns to what it owes) 
•  sales / total assets (measures the efficiency of a firm in using its assets to generate 
revenues; the higher the ratio, the more competitive the firm) 
The original coefficients Altman found through use of discriminant analysis were: 
Z = 1.2 X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3 X3 + 0.6 X4 + X5 
where Xn represent the abovementioned ratio variables. 
The decision rule is that credit should be conceded for debtors with a Z-score higher than 1.81 
and denied for those with a score below 1.81. 
In 2006, Altman re-estimated the model for private companies which resulted in different 
coefficients and threshold values: 
Z′ = 0.717X1 + 0.847X2 + 3.107X3 + 0.420X4 + 0.998X5 
 
All of the variables stay the same, with exception of the X4 variable which turns into book value 
of equity-to-total liabilities. 
Zones of discrimination for this model are: 
- Z′ > 2.9 (safe zone, concede credit) 
- 1.23 < Z′ < 2.9 (grey zone, further analysis required) 
- Z′ < 1.23 (distress zone, deny credit) 
The model is known as Z’-Score and widely applied in financial industry.  
Moreover, Altman developed a Z’’-Score which is suitable to be applied universally for either 
listed or private, U.S. and non-U.S. corporations as well as for firms within and outside the 
manufacturing sector: 
Z’’ = 6.56X1 + 3.26X2 + 6.72X3 + 1.05X4 + 3.25 
All variables are defined as for the Z’-Score with the difference that X5 has been dropped. 
 
 - 87 - 
Zones of discrimination for the Z’’-Score are: 
Z′’ > 5.85 (safe zone, concede credit) 
4.50 < Z′’< 5.85 (grey zone, requires further analysis) 
Z′’ < 4.50 (distress zone, deny credit) 
As a matter of fact, the Z-score model does not return any real probabilities of default. However, 
one can empirically match Z-scores with observed ratings and further on use the default 
probability associated with the respective rating. 
When challenged by back-testing, Altman’s Z-Score proved to be able to predict corporate 
bankruptcy two years in advance of a default event. Furthermore, it did very well in predicting 
the 2008-financial crisis when most rating agencies still assigned investment grades to highly 
distressed corporations. 
We calculated Z’’-Scores for the Banco Invest company set and conducted the empirical match 
between the Z’’-Score and implied ratings by using a conversion table of S&P (Appendix 11). 
We then compared the Z’’-Score-implied S&P ratings and S&P-implied Banco Invest ratings 
with actual ratings obtained by their internal credit risk tool (Appendix 12 & 13). 
When comparing the three different outcomes, one can see that the Z’’-Score-implied S&P 
ratings and the implied Banco Invest ratings are fairly close to the actual bank ratings (average 
divergence of app. 1 rating step). Companies with good bank ratings tend to yield better results 
in terms of Z’’-Score implied ratings. On the opposite, companies obtaining low scores in the 
bank rating model tend to obtain even lower Z’’-score implied ratings. As an interpretation, this 
means that the Banco Invest tool seems to downgrade credit quality for good rating notches 
while it underestimates credit risk for lower-quality credit notches, taken the Z-score-implied 
ratings as a benchmark. Furthermore, it can be well observed that the majority of companies 
positions itself right at the threshold between investment and speculative grade, both for the Z-
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score-implied (BB+/BBB) as well as for the actual bank ratings (6/7). This is perfectly captured 
in the assignment of a “grey zone” by the Z’’-score for most of the companies. 
It should be noticed that the Z-Score is a model purely based on financial statement information, 
not taking into account any qualitative type of information about the debtor. Industries can be 
affected to a different degree by these factors, therefore some bias in the results is 
understandable. For example, pharmaceuticals showed a Z-Score-implied rating which was 
much higher than the Banco Invest models’ rating score. This might be due to the fact that the 
Z-score fails to take into account e.g. risks stemming from entry barriers imposed by 
competitors through application of patents or superior expertise.  
Nonetheless, we still appreciate the Z-score method especially because it is easy to compute 
and mostly consists of financial statement data inputs. This resolves the issue of having public 
as well as private companies included in Banco Invests data set because financial statement data 
is readily available for both groups of companies. We would hence recommend its use to Banco 
Invest as it appears to be a holistic and easily applicable approach that can be used to reflect 




VI.2 Logit Regression Model  
Binary regression models represent a direct method for estimating probabilities of default. 
There are logit and probit models which usually retrieve the same results. Nonetheless, logit 
models allow for a simple and straightforward interpretation which made us opt for this method. 
Starting with the data collection, we used “Amadeus” platform, a database run by Bureau van 
Dijk which is part of Moody’s Analytics. Eventually, we decided upon using financial statement 
data from defaulted and non-defaulted companies which all belong to Eurozone countries. Only 
using data on Portuguese companies would have limited our sample to too few observations, 
hence the extension to other countries. We chose to use Eurozone countries because we wanted 
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to assure that they were close in characteristics to the Portuguese market and driven by a similar 
macroeconomic environment. It also allowed us to easily control for any possible currency 
effects. We excluded Ireland from the dataset because it was the only country that differed 
significantly with regard to its legal definition of bankruptcy as defined in civil law. 
Additionally, we restricted the selection of companies to entities that generated a minimum of 
€20 million in revenues in at least one year of the last 4 years where financial data was available. 
We did so in order to be in line with Banco Invest’s company portfolio in terms of the business 
volume of companies we consider.        
Apart from the aforementioned aspects, a proper and concise definition of the default state itself 
was crucial to derive accurate predictions. In our case, corporate default is defined as inactive 
companies in liquidation processes, bankruptcy procedures, dissolved through liquidation or 
dissolved through bankruptcy procedures. We were able to derive this information from the 
Amadeus platform.  
All in all, we deployed a sample of 11,376 companies, of which 1,376 companies correspond 
to the default definition and the remaining 10,000 are randomly chosen non-defaulted 
companies which satisfy the restrictions mentioned before. With regard to the proportion of 
defaulted to non-defaulted companies, one has to make sure to include enough examples of 
default in order to obtain an accurate forecast. When researching this issue, we figured out that 
the minimum proportion of default companies to non-default companies should be 5%. Our data 
sample contains 13,67% of default companies, which complies with this requirement.  
Having selected the companies that would deliver data for the vector of explanatory variables, 
further specifications of the model had to be made.  
Logit models can be performed in a static or in a dynamic way. The first method models’ PD 
based on a specific point in time while the second approach accounts for variability in the 
dependent and independent variables over time. Static models deliver better results in terms of 
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goodness-of-fit, nevertheless, they are limited to short-term predictions since there is a lot of 
uncertainty about the consistency of the coefficients when the model is applied to different 
points in time. Dynamic models use panel data as a support for the analysis, adding time as 
dimension. They usually lead to poor results in terms of goodness-of-fit, however, they are 
expected to be more consistent in the coefficients over time, since the model is able to capture 
variations caused by economic cycles and differences in the macro-environment. Hence, they 
are particularly more suitable for estimations that lie at much more distance in time. 
In order to provide Banco Invest with a more powerful tool that takes time dimension into 
account, we chose to conduct the probability of default estimation using a longitudinal/panel 
data approach. This choice implied the collection of data from various years, what made us 
deploy Amadeus’ resources of historical data at its maximum extent, downloading financial 
statement information from 2007 to 2016. 
To secure the data quality, we performed some pre-processing by transforming certain variables 
and subsequently checked on outliers.  Some coverage ratios were transformed due to their 
possibility of taking on indeterminate forms. We have found several cases of companies with 
no financial debt, consequently no interest payments, so whenever the company had zero 
interest, we increased this value to one. Additionally, variables which had an income statement 
account as denominator that could easily take on negative values (e.g. EBIT, EBITDA) were 
inverted in order to conserve monotonic properties. To limit the influence of outliers, we 
winsorized the variables in our model at the 5th and 95th percentiles of their pooled distributions 
across all firm-years. That is, we replace any observation below the 5th percentile with the value 
at the 5th percentile, and any observation above the 95th percentile with the value at the 95th 
percentile. Furthermore, we assume that companies go bankrupt in the year following the last 
available entry of financial data, so if the last financial statements are available in t, the company 
defaults in t+1. 
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Once all of the data pre-processing and checking was finalized, we could turn to the actual 
logistic regression. Logistic regressions are optimally suited to do the binary classification into 
“non-default” (y = 0) and “default” (y = 1) that we need to figure out. The vector X = (X1, …, 
Xm)
T 
 of creditor characteristics (the financial statement data, we pre-processed earlier) serves 
as input for the logistic function which will return the probability of default. In more detail, it 
is expressed by 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑝𝑖) = ln (
𝑝𝑖
1 − 𝑝𝑖
) =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝑥1,𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑚 𝑥𝑚,𝑖   
 
or alternatively,  
𝑝𝑖 =
1
1 + 𝑒−(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥1,𝑖 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑚 𝑥𝑚,𝑖 )
  
where 
𝑝 = probability of default 
xi = explanatory variables 
i = coefficient obtained through the regression 
 𝑛 = number of explanatory variables. 
For our data set, it is known whether the creditor has defaulted or not in a given time period, i.e. 
whether the probability p equals 1 or 0 instead. The challenge hence is to find coefficients βi 
which make the model-predicted probabilities of default closer to the actually observed 
outcome. 
We refrain from using absolute values for the explanatory variables in a sense that we could not 
use e.g. sales as a standalone variable input for our regression model. We rather used relative 
values meaning that e.g. we had to set sales in relation to total assets. The reason for doing so 
is that using absolute measures will lead to a high dispersion in values that are plugged into the 
regression. The use of ratios instead smoothed out any extreme values and will hence lead to 
better results for the regression model coefficients.  
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Furthermore, when setting up the regressions, special attention had to be paid for the number of 
independent variables to be included in the formula as well as for the combination between 
them. This is because we needed to avoid that the model would be overfitted or suffer from 
multicollinearity.   
As a first attempt, we examined whether the ratios used in the Financial Profile and Financial 
Policy part of our credit rating model (e.g. EBITDA/Interest, EBITDA Margin and inverted 
Debt/EBITDA) had any explanatory power in predicting the default likelihood. Trying out 
different combinations of variables within fixed as well as random effect models repeatedly 
showed us that EBITDA margin captured all the explanatory power while the rest of the 
variables were not significant. P-values of EBITDA margin were close to 0 while the p-values 
were not significant at a 5% or 10%-level for all the other variables. This result was not 
satisfactory because capturing a lot of explanatory power in only one variable of the model 
might be a hint for collinearity. We noticed that when we excluded EBITDA margin, the 
coefficients of the remaining variables changed a lot, which supports the assumption of presence 
of collinearity.  
Furthermore, our motivation was to create a regression model that would include at least one 
significant coverage and leverage ratio to be aligned with the rating model that we created. In 
order to find out about other potentially significant variables, we turned to the ones deployed in 
Altman’s Z-score.  
Most of the ratios used in Altman’s model could be calculated from the available data. However, 
we had to drop retained earnings-to-assets ratio because Amadeus does not provide information 
on retained earnings. Working capital-to-assets was also not included because it is expected that 
companies with a lower ratio will have a higher risk of default and it is expected that companies 
close to default would see this ratio shrink. Nevertheless, low working capital can also reflect a 
higher bargaining power with clients as well as operating efficiency. By using this ratio, 
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companies with naturally low levels of working capital, such as retailers, would be strongly 
penalized by our model, not reflecting their true probability of default. When including working 
capital-to-total assets in the regression model and back-testing the result, we got an abnormal 
high probability of default for Banco Invest retail companies, which was not consistent with the 
results of the internal rating model for the same companies.  
Altman’s EBIT-to-total assets and Sales-to-total assets ratios showed high significance in 
several models. However, the Equity-to-total liabilities ratio was not significant which made us 
transform it into assets-to-total liabilities which yielded good results. We chose this ratio 
because it preserves the original ratio’s structure of being an inverted solvency ratio.  
Moreover, for reasons we explained earlier, we added one additional coverage measure, namely 
EBIT-to-interest because the Altman’s model itself does not include any interest coverage ratio.  
All in all, we ended up with four different explanatory variables: EBIT-to-total assets, Sales-to-
total assets, Assets-to-Liabilities and EBIT-to-interest.  
We expect that the coefficients of the Altman-variables that we adopted for our model to yield 
similar results as in the Z-score model. Being so, EBIT-to-Assets and Sales-to-Assets should 
have shown negative signs, since the larger the ratios, the lower the probability of default.  
This reasoning is also true for Assets-to-Liabilities and EBIT-to-interest.  
Being a solvency ratio, Assets-to-Liabilities depicts how much of a company’s liabilities can be 
covered by the existent assets in case of a sudden solvency issue. If one prefers to look at the 
more common inverted ratio, Liabilities-to-Assets, the insight is the same, but with a slightly 
different reasoning. Here one is looking for how much of a company’s assets were financed 
through liabilities. The rule is that the higher the proportion between assets and liabilities, the 
better, so we expect our ratio to negatively impact probability of default, hence the coefficient 
sign should also be negative.  
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EBIT-to-interest is a common interest coverage ratio, picturing how much profit is generated to 
cover short-term interest payments. It measures how many times the firm could pay its current 
interest payments with the profits it generates. As said before, the larger the ratio, the safer the 
company is, therefore the sign of the coefficient is also expected to be negative.  
The characteristics of these variables suggested that collinearity was not present. Purely looking 
at the correlation matrix below, one can recognize that there is no incidence of elevated 
correlation between these variables. Secondly, we have conducted a regression with these 
variables and have taken the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). Results for the factor were fairly 
low, which is as well indicative of the absence of multicollinearity. Finally, after altering our 
model several times by removing and adding back different variables, we realized that the 
remaining coefficients did not change dramatically which is another good indicator for the 
absence of multicollinearity. 
Correlation Matrix 
 
Default EBIT/Total Asset Sales/Total Asset 
Total Asset/         
Total Liabilities 
EBIT/Interest 
Default 1 -0.3 -0.03 -0.15 -0.15 
EBIT/Total Asset -0.3 1 0.11 0.36 0.55 
Sales/Total Asset -0.03 0.11 1 0.04 0.18 
Total Asset/Total Liabilities -0.15 0.36 0.04 1 0.28 
EBIT/Interest -0.15 0.55 0.18 0.28 1 
 
Econometric research has come up with different approaches to determine the coefficients of 
this binary model. The most used one is the fixed effects model. This method is mostly used 
whenever the econometrician wants to understand the impact of the variables that vary over 
time. The main assumption behind is that there are some individual characteristics, for instance 
the country or industry a company operates in, which can impact or bias the coefficients. In 
other words, there is correlation between each entity’s error terms and the independent 
variables. Hence, fixed effect models remove the effect of these characteristics that do not vary 
over time, leading to more consistent coefficients for the regressors that remain in the regression 
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model. Another important assumption is that those time-invariant features are unique for a 
single company and therefore should not be correlated with the characteristics of other 
companies. Explained in a mathematical way, the error term of each entity as well as the 
constant, which captures those invariant characteristics, should not be correlated with those of 
other companies.  
As a second alternative, one may use random effects models. These models assume that 
differences between companies can have a high impact on the dependent variable. Thus, one 
can use time-invariant regressors such as country and industry, under the assumption that the 
company’s error term is not correlated with the regressors. In other words, differences across 
entities are hypothesized as being random and uncorrelated with the regressors.  
Fixed effects models seem to be the more appropriate approach for our model since we want to 
evaluate in general terms what drives bankruptcy for any kind of company, independently from 
the industry it belongs to. Nevertheless, we have done a Hausman Specification test to determine 
which method is indeed the correct one. Under the null hypothesis, the difference in the 
coefficients is non-systematic meaning that random effects models are the proper method to 
choose, otherwise the alternative states that fixed-effects models are the better choice. In our 
case, the null hypothesis is rejected, therefore we should use fixed effects.   
 
Hausman Specification Test 
 
 X  fixed X random Difference S.E. 
EBIT/Total Asset -7.7 -6.31 -1.39 0.38 
Sales/Total Asset -0.15 -0.03 -0.13 0.04 
Total Asset/Total Liabilities -1.7 -0.44 -1.25 0.16 
EBIT/Interest -0.01 0 -0.01 0 
     
Chi
2
 144.70    
Prob. > Chi
2
 0.00    
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By selecting this model, all the non-default companies have been dropped from the estimations 
since there is no variation in the dependent variable. Furthermore, default companies with only 
one year of observation were also dropped due to lack of variability. 
We have tried different combinations of the four aforementioned variables and selected the final 
one based on relative goodness-of-fit measures, the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and 
the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). According to these criterions, the final model turned 
out to be the one composed by all of the four variables, EBIT-to-Assets, EBIT-to-interest, 
Assets-to-Liabilities and Sales-to-Assets.  
Also, pseudo-𝑅2  were computed, McFadden (0.2384), Cox+Snell (0.1203) and Nagelkerke 
(0.2892), whose results represent a good overall fit for this kind of regressions.  
We could not include lagged variables or first differences due to the initial transformations we 
have done with the data. We expected to find extreme values for most variables close to default 
events, being located either below the 5th percentile or above the 95th percentile. Due to the 
transformation, those variables would retrieve the same value over different years, possibly 
biasing the coefficients of the predictors.  
 
Dynamic Regression Outcomes: 
 
 Coef. Std. Err. z p>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
EBIT/Total Assets -7.698 0,531 -14.50 0.00 -8.739 -6.657 
Sales/Total Assets -0.152 0,041 -3.69 0.00 -0.233 -0.071 
Total Asset/Total Liabilities -1.695 0,194 -8.70 0.00 -2.077 -1.313 
EBIT/Interest -0.006 0,003 -2.04 0.04 -0.012 0.0002 
       
Log likelihood -1387.17      
LR chi2 (4) 868.34      
Prob. > chi
2
 0.00      
 
 
With all the regression coefficients in place, it is now possible to calculate actual PDs for all 




−(𝛽1 𝑥1,𝑖 +⋯+𝛽𝑗 𝑥𝑗,𝑖+⋯+ 𝛽𝑚 𝑥𝑚,𝑖 )
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We substitute all 𝛽𝑗 by the coefficients obtained from the regression and all  𝑥𝑗,𝑖 by the 
respective financial statement data input for each company.  
As a next step, we calculated estimation errors from the PDs we obtained. There can be two 
different types of errors caused by an incorrect prediction of default. Firstly, for a given 
threshold of default risk, the model does not predict the default when default actually 
happened. In other words, let’s consider an analyst who defines that 7% probability of default 
is his limit of risk at which he is willing to invest in a company/security. The first error type 
captures all the default events that have actually happened in the following year, when the 
model-estimated probability was in fact lower than the threshold.  
The second type of error occurs, if for a given threshold of default risk, the model predicts 
default when default actually did not happen. Appendix 14 presents the two error types 
mentioned for a set of different thresholds of risk. In red, we clearly see that when the threshold 
of risk increases, the model is less able to account for default events when they actually happen 
(Type I error). Saying in another way, if an investor is not willing to invest in companies with 
more than 5% of PD, about 15% of the total bankruptcy events in one year had an estimated 
probability lower than that 5%.  In the other extreme, if the threshold is 50%, 80% of the 
companies that have defaulted in the next year are inside his portfolio. In theory, this value can 
be reduced to zero the better the model fits. However, our model cannot differentiate e.g. 
whether a company defaulted due to financial fraud or not. If so, financial accounts could have 
been artificially inflated and these numbers will be captured by our model, not reflecting the 
actual financial health of the firm. Since we only have limited options to exclude these effects, 
we will keep obtaining a certain level of estimation errors.   
One might be biased towards a more conservative approach (lower risk-threshold), however 
that can also limit the potential portfolio due to the second type of errors, graphed in orange.  In 
our model, for a threshold of 5%, almost 70% of the companies that didn’t default in the next 
 - 98 - 
year will be excluded from the portfolio, due to estimation error. This error behaves in the 
inverse way as the other one, so the higher the threshold the lower the number of excluded 
companies. The second error type was taken from an in-sample analysis, only composed by 
default companies, hence being possibly too biased for default events in periods when default 
did not actually happen. For a more accurate calculation of these errors, one should calculate 
them using out-of-the-sample companies, where a substantial reduction in the volume of these 
errors can be expected. The series in grey (Appendix 14) indicates how these errors behave 
when the model is applied to another sample of data on 65,535 companies from 2015 that did 
not default in 2016 and where the same restrictions as in the previous sample were imposed to. 
The results strengthen the hypothesis of strong bias in the default group which overestimated 
the true probability of default. The following graph indicates possible points for the choice of 
the optimal threshold which minimizes both error types. Looking at the results, it seems 
reasonable to select thresholds below 10%.  
The results shown can be analysed in a different way when looking at the relationship between 
estimated probability of default and the number of years before the default event (Appendix 15). 
Not surprisingly, the further away we are from the default event, the lower the estimated 
probability of default we obtain. However, there is a significant change two years before the 
default event, not only in the average of companies’ probability of default, but also in its median. 
This can have significant implications for our model. Even though being build up to predict 
default within one year’s horizon, it seems like our model is sensitive enough to capture changes 
in the probability of default that are more distant in time. On the other hand, the second error 
type described above (in-sample analysis) can be mostly driven by the poorer performance of 
the variables of the model in the years close to the default event.  
In Appendix 16, we show that, for a threshold of 5%, the second error type diminishes when 
removing the observations closer to the default event, as suggested by the previous graph. 
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Nevertheless, due to the minimal amplitude of the change, we may conclude that most of those 
errors are intrinsic to the goodness-of-fit of the model itself.  
Furthermore, we have estimated the model with lagged values of the previous variables in order 
to test whether it is possible to estimate probability of default at a two years’ horizon. The 
regression below proved to be worthy, confirming our hypothesis from before. 
 
Dynamic Lagged Regression Outcomes 
 
 Coef. Std. Err. z p>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
EBIT/Total Assets -6.969 -0.575 -12.11 0.000 -8.097 -5.841 
Sales/Total Assets -0.131 0.045 -2.87 0.004 -0.221 -0.041 
Total Asset/Total Liabilities -1.161 0.200 -5.80 0.000 -1.553 -0.769 
EBIT/Interest -0.005 0.002 -1.84 0.065 -0.011 0.0003 
       
Log likelihood -1523.06      
LR chi
2
 (4) 456.21      
Prob. > chi2 0.00      
 
However, when comparing the AIC and BIC of the two regressions as presented below, one 
can clearly state that our previous model is much better in terms of fit, since both of them are 
much lower in the first model. By looking at the Pseudo R^2, one may conclude the same, 
since McFadden (0.1303), Cox+Snell (0.071) and Nagelkerke (0.1644) are also much lower 
than in the non-lagged model. Moreover, when calculating the two types of errors, the results 
were much poorer than before, with strong exposure to those errors at any given threshold of 
risk. Henceforth, we do not use the lagged regression coefficients to determine PDs.  
 
Comparison of AIC and BIC measures for both regression models 
 AIC BIC 
Dynamic Model 2,782.34 2,809.62 
Lagged Model 3,054.11 3,081.04 
 
Using the results of the logit regression model, we then proceed to its implementation for Banco 
Invest’s company portfolio. We wanted to primarily find out if there was a consistent inverse 
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relationship between the probabilities of default obtained through the regression and the rating 
scores derived from the internal Banco Invest model.  
We conducted the same data pre-processing for the financial statement variables as described 
in the setup of the logit regression. We calculated 5th percentile and 95th percentile threshold 
values for all the four variables that feed into the regression by deploying a set of 1,206 
defaulted and non-defaulted companies belonging to the Iberian market. Following the results 
we obtained, we suggest limiting the variable inputs for each Banco Invest company according 
to the following table: 
Percentile Bound Limitation 
Variable Transformation Table 
EBIT/assets – upper bound 0.34 
EBIT/assets – lower bound -0.46 
Sales/Assets – upper bound 11.5 
Sales/Assets – lower bound 0.1 
Assets/Liabilities – upper bound 7.0 
Assets/Liabilities – lower bound 0.5 
EBIT/Interest – upper bound 125.0 
EBIT/Interest – lower bound -25.0 
 
 
The probabilities of default we obtained for Banco Invest’s company portfolio are presented in 
Appendix 17. 
In general terms, the regression model seems to capture most of the enhancements or 
deteriorations in the level of internal ratings with probabilities of default decreasing or 
increasing gradually in most cases. Hovione again appears as the best company to invest in in 
terms of PD, which is consistent with the internal rating as well as the Z’’-Score. Mota-Engil 
continues to be the worst company also by probability of default which confirms the results we 
obtained from the Z’’-Score and the Banco Invest tool. Furthermore, it can be observed that the 
logit model seems to perform better using the latest financial statement data available because 
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the inverse relationship between PD and rating score is more consistent here than with data 
inputs from one year back in time. 
Notwithstanding the mostly satisfactory results that we obtained, we see a couple of limitations 
and weaknesses in our logit regression model. First of all, the model is not able to control for 
industry specific characteristics that similarly affect ratio inputs. One could have also created a 
model for each industry using the fixed effects approach, where the coefficients would have 
returned a more precise PD when compared to the actual industry PD.  
An industry-tilted approach would have, however, been challenged by highly diversified 
companies whose mix of sectors would have been difficult to capture in a regression model. 
Moreover, we did not dispose of enough data resources to run industry-specific regressions. By 
maintaining the standardization of our regression model, we forego these problems at the 
expense of more imprecise coefficients and PD outcomes.  
Another pitfall might be linked to our data sample itself. Similar academic studies have used 
data where observations were measured at higher time frequencies, with quarterly or monthly 
data, over a longer period of time, sometimes up to 40 years. Our model was designed to 
estimate the probability of default for private and public companies, where the information 
availability for private companies is typically restricted to annual financial reports. Therefore, 
the frequency of time periods between observations cannot be changed. Moreover, our model 
is based on ten years’ data, which were characterized by high volatility and an economic 
recession. We attribute some of the inaccurateness in results to this aspect, but at the same time 
think that our model will deliver more precise results over time, as more years of information 
will be available on Amadeus platform and included in the regression. 
An additional weakness resides in the fact that we could not match the estimated PD from the 
regression model with the implied PD for a certain rating score. The most common approach 
to compute the implied PD is by using cumulative default rates. This method sorts the data 
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given a specific endogenous classification, for instance, rating scores, and calculates the 
proportion of companies that have defaulted conditional on that classification. This process is 
more complex the more years one adds because it is built up by marginal default rates. However, 
our model only pretends to estimate default events for a one-year horizon, therefore we cannot 
carry out this method. To give an example, one could estimate the implied probability of default 
by joining all the companies with the same S&P-implied rating score and calculate how much 
of them have defaulted on a one-year horizon. This proportion will then be the implied PD 
associated with that rating score. This method of estimation enables the incorporation of 
qualitative information in the model, endogenous to the rating score, which cannot be accessed 
by our model. While being strictly limited to rated companies, this method is obsolete for 
private non-rated companies. 
  
 
VI.3 Comparison of Results for Test Sample  
As a last step of our analysis we want to compare and contrast results from Z’’-Score 
calculations, Z’’-Score-implied S&P ratings, Banco Invest ratings and the probability of default 
with results of our new rating model. We use the same sample of Banco Invest client companies 
as in the test performed in the previous chapter. While we have compared single components 
of this table in earlier passages of the report, we would now like to give a comprehensive 













 y y-1 y y-1 y y-1 y y-1 y y-1 
Jerónimo Martins  10,89 7,15 10 9 9 9 1,81% 2,56% 9 8 
Hovione Farmaciencia  
 
8,65 7,54 10 9 8 8 0,22% 0,32% 7 8 
Galp Energia 6,05 5,93 7 7 8 7 1,65% 2,34% 7 6 
Eletricidade Dos Açores 
SA 
5,32 4,91 6 6 8 8 3,27% 4,19% 7 7 
Colep Portugal  5,31 5,12 6 6 7 6 3,24% 4,75% 6 6 
Dufry AG 5,19 4,69 6 5 7 6 5,38% 6,35% 7 7 
Sovena Oilseeds Portugal  5,32 5,46 6 6 6 7 5,88% 4,44% 6 6 
Empresa de Electricidade 
da Madeira 
4,25 4,35 5 5 6 7 8,07% 7,84% 6 7 
  
The companies are sorted in descending order according to the Z’’-Score. At first sight, one can 
see that for the last year of available company data, our model delivers gradually decreasing 
rating scores, except for Dufry. When taking data from one year earlier, the decrease is not as 
gradual, but at the same time, ratings do not jump or diverge to much from a monotonically 
decreasing behaviour.  Furthermore, our rating outcomes are close to Banco Invests ratings, 
with a maximum deviation of 1 rating step and a match in ratings of 43,75%. Our model tends 
to return lower ratings for high-quality credit notches than Banco Invest’s tool while it delivers 
approximately equal results for lower-quality credit classes. We think this outcome is justified 
in light of the fact that we deal with several private companies in the data set where data 
availability is scarce. We hence accept the more prudent and conservative outcome of our rating 
tool and do not consider it as a critical.  The probabilities of default that we derive from the 
Logit model do not always show an inverse relationship to a given increase/decrease in our 
rating model and they also do not show any specific pattern in how they grow or decline. 
Nonetheless, a rough increase in PD can be observed along weakening credit notches of our 
rating model which should be satisfactory in light of the limitations that we faced when setting 
up the regression.  
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All in all, the comparison of results for the test sample should be interpreted in a way that no 
model can be said to deliver perfectly reliable results when considered in isolation. Nonetheless, 
the proximity of result and observable tendencies leave us confident that our proposed model 
appears to work out decently. While we compared our model to Banco Invest’s model earlier in 
the report by a few self-imposed quality criteria, here, we find its quality confirmed even 
stronger by its approximate correspondence in tendencies to Z’’-Score and PD measures.   
  




As outlined in the introduction of the work project, our goal was to develop a credit scoring 
model for large to medium-sized corporate clients of Banco Invest. The internal rating model 
currently used by Banco Invest’s credit department served as starting point for the project and 
was to be improved during the course of our work. Moreover, we were supposed to add 
methodologies which facilitate the measurement of probabilities of default, a feature that the 
original credit scoring model did not cover.  
We unfolded with the thesis project by deeply analysing the internal rating tool and various 
data sets the bank placed at our disposal. The subsequent set-up of our own rating model which 
builds upon the original model required the application of knowledge spanning various areas 
of finance such as accounting, financial statement analysis, corporate finance and 
macroeconomics. The tool that we obtained includes insights from Moody’s and Standard & 
Poor’s rating methodologies, the application of theories provided by academic literature, 
suggestions from the staff at the Banco Invest credit risk department as well as our own 
reasoning based on the knowledge we acquired during our Master studies. Our main 
modifications entail a differentiation of the company portfolio by industries, the respective 
adaption of model weights by sector, review of model factors and adjustments of rating 
scorecards. 
As a next step, we were supposed to elaborate models that allow for the estimation of the 
probability of default, which required us to refer back to econometric and statistical theory in 
order to come up with both, the Altman Z-Score and the Logit regression model.  
After having developed these two pillars of our thesis project, we were challenged to find out 
whether our proposed credit risk model would yield results that were able to properly capture 
the different variables that drive credit risk and would hence lead to a precise assessment of the 
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actual credit risk exposure of a company. In order to solve this question, it proved helpful to 
compare and contrast both pillars with one another. In this way, the probability of default 
measures were not only an extension of Banco Invest’s original model but moreover useful in 
verifying and substantiating the proper functioning of our new model. We tested our rating 
scores against those obtained by Banco Invest and again compared all of the rating scores to 
the probability of default measures that we newly established for the entire company portfolio 
of Banco Invest. The results we obtained were by far not perfectly corresponding in their values 
and meaning, nevertheless, they also did not overly diverge from another and oftentimes 
indicated the same tendencies and behaviours regarding the assessment of default risk exposure. 
The excel model, we additionally created, translates all of this report’s content in an easy-to-
use application, facilitating Banco Invest with the option to make the aforementioned 
comparison with only a few data inputs.  
As several of our model inputs are tilted to current economic conditions and will consequently 
change over time, the rating model needs to be updated frequently. The same applies to the logit 
regression model where we suppose that it will deliver more precise results the more data 
becomes included over time.   
Finally, we would like to reinforce at this point that all the measures we present in this thesis 
should not be regarded as stand-alone metrics that claim to have to ability to perfectly predict 
corporate financial stability. We rather perceive them to work best when evaluated as a group 
of indicators, each one of them having its own informative value. While our credit risk model 
can be blamed for being biased due to subjectivity in the assessment of qualitative factors, 
models that are purely based on financial data inputs may particularly lack informational 
content transmitted by those factors. Considering both as complementary to one another and 
evaluating them within one aggregate analysis can lead to enhanced rating assessments since 






Appendix 1 - Banco Invest “Scale” Scorecard 
Revenue (in € MM) 
Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca C D 
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 




Appendix 2 - Banco Invest “Financial Profile” Scorecard 
 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca Caa Ca 
 
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Net Debt / EBITDA < 0,5 < 1,25 < 2 < 3 < 4,5 < 6 < 8 < 10 < 12 > 12 
EBITDA / Interest Expenses > 20 > 15 > 10 > 6 > 3 > 2 > 1 > 0 < 0 - 
RCF / Net Debt > 80% > 60% > 40% > 25% > 15% > 7,5% > 2,5% > 0 < 0 - 









Appendix 3 - Banco Invest “Business Profile” Scorecard 
 
 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca Caa Ca 
 







business cycles.  
Products / Services 
(P/S) with well-
known history 
Stable and reliable 
demand, though 
could have some 
exposure to 
economic cycles. 
P/S very necessary 
on daily basis, with 







high. P/S with 
well-known history   





P/S, with low 
elasticity and 
historical known. 




The variations of 
revenues are 
relatively small, 
though could have 
significant changes 
over the years 
Stable demand on 
the medium term; 
moderated 
exposure to 
economic cycles or 







of purchases occurs 








could be significant 
Expected stable 







historical. P/S have 
some discretionary 
characteristics; 













demand, but the 
stability along the 
economic cycle is 




















Recent P/S with 
path of unknown 
demand across the 
economic cycle. 













variations or in 
structural decrease; 





not important for 
the consumer 
--- --- 











nominal growth of 
GDP 
Predictably organic 
growth close to 




nominal growth of 
GDP 
Negative organic 
growth rates for 
most of the 
products; high risk 
of replacement; 
secular decline in 
demand for some 
products 
Growth rates for 
the most of P/S 
significantly 
negatives/ demand 
for mostly of P/S 
in structural 
decline 
Market in decline 
for mostly of P/S 
of the company. 
Market may be 
disappearing 
completely over a 
time horizon of 3 





a wide range of 
services; Final 






a wide range of 
services; Final 






a wide range of 
services in some of 







a wide range of 
services at least in 
of the principal 
segmentation; 






a wide range of 
services at least in 







segments, but it 




Operates only in 
one business 





Operates only in 
one business 















 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca Caa Ca 
 
















in few threats to 
competitive 




































least 15% of the 
NPV and the 
largest market with 
less than 25% of 
the NPV.  




at least 15% of the 
NPV and the 
largest market with 
a weight> 25% of 





least 10% of the 
VN and the largest 
market <25% of 
the VN 




at least 10% of the 
NPV and the 
largest market with 
a weight> 25% of 
NPV; OR (B) 3 or 
more distinct 
business segments 
and the largest 
market <25% of 
VN 
  
(A) 3 or more 
distinct business 
segments and the 
largest market with 
weight> 25% of 
NPV; OR (B) 2 or 
more distinct 
business segments, 
each with more 
than 15% of the 
VN and the largest 
market <25% of 
the VN.  




and the largest 
market with a 
weight> 25% of 
NPV; OR (B) 2 or 
more distinct 
business segments, 
each with more 
than 10% of the 
VN and the largest 
market <25% of 
the VN.  




and the largest 
market with a 
weight> 25% of 
NPV; OR (B) 2 or 
more distinct 
business segments 
and the largest 
market <25% of 
VN.  
(A) 2 or more 
distinct business 
segments and the 
largest market with 
a weight> 25% of 
NPV; OR (B) 1 
distinct business 
segment and the 
largest market 
<25% of VN.  
(A) 2 or more 
distinct business 
segments and the 
largest market with 
a weight> 25% of 
NPV; OR (B) 1 
distinct business 
segment and the 
largest market> 
25% of VN.  
--- --- 
           
           
           





          
 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca Caa Ca 
 











likelihood of new 
competitors. 
Dominant market 










are not within 
reach of most 
competitors; 






players have more 
than 80% MS) 
Strong position but 
with some 
competition; P/S 
can be replicated 
but with significant 
investments. 




Market share of 
leadership (> 40%) 
in industry with 
limited competition  
Barriers to entry or 
high switching 
costs limit the 
entry of new 
competitors. P / S 
can be replicated 














of entry into the 
market are 
reasonable for most 
potential 
competitors. 
Market share> 20% 
or strong niche 
player  







barriers to entry or 
little change costs 
encourage new 
competitors. Local 
or niche player in a 
key market or 
segment  
No barriers to 






risk / pressure to 
maintain margins  
No barriers to 
entry; P/S has 
commodity 
characteristics. 






Access to multiple 
suppliers, company 
has strong negotiating 
ability on these; Use 
of raw 
materials/commodities 
with global markets; 
State and Regulators 
with little or no 
intervention  
Access to multiple 
suppliers, 
















limited, being an 
open market  
It has alternatives 
for major 
suppliers, although 
one may have 
greater negotiating 
capacity; State and 
Regulators have 
some intervention 









intervention in the 
market that can 
affect profitability 
A large part of the 
NPV (> 30%) 
depends on 1 or 2 
suppliers with 
greater negotiating 




intervention in the 
market setting 
prices and/or 
margins or through 
concessions  
More than 50% of 
the NPV depends 
on 1 or 2 suppliers 
with greater 
negotiating 




intervention in the 
market setting 
prices and/or 
margins or through 
concessions 
More than 50% of 
the NPVV depends 
almost exclusively 
on 1 supplier with 
greater negotiating 




intervention in the 
market setting 
prices and/or 











Appendix 4 - Banco Invest “Financial Policy” Scorecard 
 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca C R 
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necessary and 
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Some of the 
major 
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able to raise / 
realize capital 
increases if 
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the interests of 
the creditor and 
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Some risk of 
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interests of the 
shareholder 
rather than the 
creditor; Above 
average risk due 










that creates high 
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Financial policy 











Appendix 5 – S&P Standard Competitive Position Group Profile by Sector and Industry  
 
 















Real estate operating companies 
Auto suppliers 
Auto parts and equipment 
Tires and rubber 
Vehicle-related supplier 












Electrical components and equipment 
Heavy electrical equipment 
Industrial machinery 
Construction and farm machinery 
Building materials  Building materials  
Package express Air freight and logistics 
Containers and packaging 
Metal and glass containers 
Paper packaging 
Merchant power Independent power producers and energy traders 
  Merchant power 
Aerospace and defence Aerospace and defence 
Health Care equipment and service 
Equipment and Supplies 















Services and Branded Products Industries 
Leisure and sports 
Casinos and gaming 
Hotels, resorts, and cruise lines 
Leisure facilities 
Engineering and construction Engineering and construction 
Business services 
Security and alarm services 
Facilities management services 
Human resource and employment services 
Research and consulting services 
Insurance brokers and related service providers 
Technology - Software and service 
Internet software and service 









Apparel, accessories goods 




Movies and entertainment 
Publishing 
Retail 




Home improvement retail 
Department stores 
General merchandise stores 
Specialty stores 
Computer and electronics retail 
Branded nondurable 
Brewers 
Distillers and vintners 
Soft drink 




Telecom and cable 
Cable and satellite 
Alternative carriers 
Integrated telecommunication service 
Wireless telecommunication service 





















Marine ports and services 
  
  




Coal and consumable fuels 
Diversified metals and mining 
Gold 
Precious metals and minerals 
Oil and gas production 
Integrated oil and gas 
Oil and gas exploration and production 
Oil and gas drilling, equipment and service 
Oil and gas drilling 
Oil and gas equipment and services 




Fertilizers and agricultural chemicals 











Appendix 6 - Banco Invest Companies Sector Allocation 
 
 
Company Sector Allocation Industry 
Almirall S.A. Capital and Asset-Intensive Pharmaceutical 
Altri, SGPS, S.A. 
Capital and Asset-Intensive Forest products 
National Industries and Utilities Multi-Utilities 
Bial Portela, S.A. Capital and Asset-Intensive Pharmaceutical 
Campofrio FoodGroup, S.A. Services and Branded Products Branded nondurable 
CIN - Corporação Industrial do Norte, S.A. Capital and Asset-Intensive 
Specialty Chemicals 
Building Materials 
COLEP Portugal, SA Capital and Asset-Intensive Containers and packaging 
Dufry AG Services and Branded Products Retail 
EDA - Eletricidade dos Açores, S.A. National Industries and Utilities Electric Utilities 
EEM- Empresa de Electricidade da Madeira, S.A. National Industries and Utilities Electric Utilities 
ENCE Energía y Celulosa S.A. 
Capital and Asset-Intensive Forest products 
National Industries and Utilities Multi-Utilities 
Esporão, S.A. Services and Branded Products Branded nondurable 
Estoril Sol, SGPS, S.A.   Services and Branded Products Leisure and sports 
Galp Energia, SGPS, S.A. Pure Commodity 
Oil and gas production 
Oil and gas drilling, equipment and service 
Grupo Pestana, SGPS, S.A. Services and Branded Products Leisure and sports 
Hovione Farmaciencia, S.A. Capital and Asset-Intensive Pharmaceutical 
Impresa, SGPS, S.A. Services and Branded Products Media and entertainment 
Jerónimo Martins, SGPS, S.A. Services and Branded Products Retail 
JMR-Gestao de Empresas de Retalho, SGPS, S.A. Services and Branded Products Retail 
José de Mello Saúde, S.A. Capital and Asset-Intensive Health care equipment and services 





Company Macro Sector Industry 
Mota Engil, SGPS, S.A. 
Services and Branded Products 
Engineering and construction 
Environmental services 
National Industries and Utilities 
Transportation infrastructure 
Multi-Utilities 
NOS, SGPS, S.A. Services and Branded Products 
Telecom and cable 
Media and entertainment 
Media and entertainment 
RAR - Sociedade de Controle (Holding), S.A. 
Capital and Asset-Intensive 
Containers and packaging 
REITs 
Pure Commodity Agribusiness and commodity foods 
Services and Branded Products Branded nondurable 
Secil - Companhia Geral de Cal e Cimento, S.A. Capital and Asset-Intensive Building Materials 
Semapa - Sociedade de Investimento e Gestão, SGPS, 
SA 
Capital and Asset-Intensive Building Materials 
Capital and Asset-Intensive Forest products 
Sonae Capital, SGPS, S.A. 
Capital and Asset-Intensive Capital goods 
National Industries and Utilities Multi-Utilities 
Services and Branded Products 
Leisure and sports 
Leisure and sports 
Sonae Investimentos - SGPS, S.A. Services and Branded Products Retail 
Sonae - SGPS, S.A. Services and Branded Products 
Retail 
Telecom and cable 
Sovena Group - SGPS, S.A. 
Pure Commodity 
Agribusiness and commodity foods 
Oil and gas production 
Services and Branded Products Branded nondurable 
Sovena Oilseeds Portugal S.A. Pure Commodity Agribusiness and commodity foods 
Sovena Portugal - Consumer Goods, S.A. Services and Branded Products Branded nondurable 
Sumol + Compal Marcas S.A. Services and Branded Products Branded nondurable 




Appendix 7 – “Scale” Scorecard Proposal 
 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca C D 
 
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 







































Industry Average ROIC Industry Average ROIC 
Aerospace and defense 18,00% Raw Commodity 8,00% 
Agribusiness and commodity foods 12,00% Media and entertainment 16,00% 
Auto OEM 7,00% Merchant power 8,00% 
Auto suppliers 13,00% Midstream energy 8,00% 
Branded nondurable 14,00% Oil and gas drilling, equipment and service 10,00% 
Building materials  5,00% Oil and gas production 14,00% 
Business services 8,00% Pharmaceutical 26,00% 
Capital Goods 13,00% Package express 10,00% 
Commodity chemicals 7,00% REITs 14,00% 
Consumer durables 18,00% Retail 10,00% 
Containers and packaging 10,00% Specialty chemicals 13,00% 
Engineering and construction 14,00% Technology - hardware and semiconductors 11,00% 
Environmental service 8,00% Technology - software and service 22,00% 
Forest and products 11,00% Telecom and cable 7,00% 
Health care equipment and services 15,00% Transportation  8,00% 
Homebuilders 2,00% Transportation infrastructure 8,00% 
Leisure and sports 7,00% Utilities 6,00% 
 
 




Appendix 8 – “Business Profile” Scorecard Proposal 
 
Industry Risk           
 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca C D 
 
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Market 
Characteristics 


















to economic cycles 
and strong entry 
barriers. 
















to be nearly 
essential. 
OR   







and strong entry 
barriers. 
Mostly stable with 
moderate exposure 
to business cycles; 
known history and 
little elastic 
demand. Moderate 




to be very 
important. 
OR    
Mostly stable with 
moderate exposure 
to business cycles; 
known history and 
presence of entry 
barriers. 
Steady demand 
expected over the 
medium term; 
moderate exposure 
to business cycles 
and medium-term 
history. Demand 
exhibits some signs 
of elasticity and the 
risk of product 
substitution begins 
to surface. The 
products, or 
services, perceived 




expected over the 
medium term with 
moderate exposure 
to business cycles 
and limited entry 
barriers. 
Steady demand 
expected over the 
short term with 
significant 
exposure to 
business cycles and 
recent history. 
Demand exhibits 
clear signs of 
elasticity and the 
risk of product 
substitution is 
readily evident. 
The products, or 
services, perceived 




expected over the 
medium term with 
moderate exposure 
to business cycles 




but its stability 
over the economic 




recent or little 
history and the risk 
of product 
substitution is easy. 
The products, or 
services, perceived 
to be of limited 
important. 
Unknown demand 
path through the 
business cycles and 
little or no history. 
Demand is 
completely elastic; 






under even mild 
macroeconomic or 
cyclical factors. 
The products, or 
services, are little 










under even mild 
macroeconomic or 
cyclical factors. 
The products, or 
services, are not 














 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca C D 




very high and 
sustainable organic 
growth inside a 
maturity stage with 
a higher growth 
compared to the 
GDP. The products 
or services, hardly 
will be outdated 







growth inside a 
maturity stage. The 
products or 
services, hardly 
will be outdated 





risk that the 
products or 
services, will be 








growth inside an 




Moderate risk that 
the products or 
services, will be 





risk that the 
products or 
services, will be 
outdated over time.  
Negative organic 
growth rates. High 
risk that the 
products or 
services, will be 
outdated over time.  
High negative 
organic growth 
rates and moderate 
risk of market 
crisis. High risk 
that the products or 
services, will be 
outdated over 
medium term.  
Many years of 
negative organic 
growth rates and 
evidence of market 
crisis. High risk 
that the products or 






Evidence of little 
or no Government 
and Regulators 
interferences; 
access to multiple 
suppliers and 
strong negotiation 
ability. Political or 
natural events 




under a fully 
developed 
framework that is 
national in scope, 
nearly absolute 
monopoly, and 
with the possibility 
to renegotiate the 
rates over time. 
Evidence of little 
or no Government 
and Regulators 
interferences and 
access to multiple 
suppliers. The 
company has some 
negotiation ability. 





under a fully 
developed 
framework that is 
national in scope, 
nearly absolute 
monopoly, and 
with the possibility 
to renegotiate the 






limited. Access to 
multiple suppliers 





political or natural 
events. 







and with the 
possibility to 
renegotiate the 






limited. Access to 
alternative 
suppliers which 
some may have 
greater negotiation 
capacity. Evidence 
of political or 
natural events 
influence. 
OR      
Regulation occurs 




but it may become 
an open market in 











some may have 
greater negotiation 
capacity. Evidence 
of political or 
natural events 
influence.                                                                                    
OR   
Regulation occurs 




but it may become 








in the market 
setting prices or 
margins or through 
concessions. The 
company depend 
on 1 or 2 main 
suppliers with 
greater negotiation 
capacity.  Strong 
evidence of 
political or natural 
events influence.                                                                                    
OR       
Regulation occurs 




but could be 







in the market 
setting prices or 
margins or through 
concessions. The 
company depend 
more than 50% on 
1 or 2 main 
suppliers with
greater negotiation 
capacity.  Political 








in the market 
setting prices or 
margins or through 
concessions. The 
company depend 
more than 50% on 
1 supplier with 
greater negotiation 
capacity.  Political 













Company Risk           
 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca C D 








services that are 
difficult to 
replicate. 
OR   
Clear leader in 
multiple categories 




or strong reputation 
in the market. 




advantage which is 
expected to remain 
in the long term; 
excellent dominant 
position which is 
expected to remain 














Clear leader in at 
least two markets 
with high product 
differentiation; 
some recognized 
brands or good 
reputation in the 
market. Customer 




advantage which is 




position which is 
expected to remain 





only with some 
competitors; 
products or 





Clear leader in at 
least one market 




or good reputation 
in the market. 
Customer loyalty is 
high.  
OR   
Good competitive 
advantage which is 
expected to remain 
in the long term; 
good dominant 
position which is 
expected to remain 






threats; products or 





One of the leaders 






or good reputation 
in the market. 
Customer has 
loyalty, but not 
exclusively, to 
brand.  




position which are 
expected to remain 







how; products or 




OR   
One of the leaders 






maintain brand or 
reputation 
positioning. Brand 
has medium level 
of awareness but 







position which are 
expected to remain 






how; difficulty to 




Discrete position in 





maintain brand or 
reputation 
positioning. Brand 
has low level of 
awareness and the 














brand or reputation 
has minimal to no 
level of awareness 







very hard to keep 
products or 
services 
differentiated.   
OR    
Weakly positioned 

















 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca C D 






flexibility in capital 
outlays. The 
company is 








OR   
Strong presence of 
economies of 
scales or strong 
competitive 
advantage in terms 
of costs of 
production. Strong 




strong flexibility in 
capital outlays. The 









OR   
Good presence of 
economies of 
scales or good 
competitive 
advantage in terms 
of costs of 
production. Strong 
flexibility in capital 
outlays. 
Cost management 
efficient with good 
flexibility in capital 
outlays. The 
company is  able to 
reduce 
significantly the 
cost in the most of 




OR   
Discrete presence 
of economies of 
scales or discrete 
competitive 
advantage in terms 
of costs of 
production. Good 
flexibility in capital 
outlays. 
Cost management 
efficient with good 
flexibility in capital 
outlays. The 
company is able to 
reduce 
significantly the 
cost in some cases. 
Fixed costs near to 
the competitors. 
OR   
Low presence of 
economies of 
scales and weak 
competitive 
advantage in terms 
of costs of 
production. Good 






in capital outlays. 
The company is 
able to reduce 
significantly the 
cost only in 
designed cases. 




efficient with low 
flexibility in capital 
outlays. The 
company is is not 
able to reduce 
significantly the 
cost in the most of 




Almost no cost 
management 
strategy; low 
flexibility in capital 
outlays. The 
company is is not 
almost able to 
reduce 
significantly the 






strategy; very low 
flexibility in capital 
outlays. The 
company is is not 







group of business 
segment with a 
wide range of 
services. End-
market is well 
diversified with no 
costumer 
concentration.  
OR   
Operates at least in 
7 or more product 
segments; no 
exposure for more 
than 30% of the 




segments with a 







OR   
Operates at least in 
5 or more product 
segments; no 
exposure for more 
than 40% of the 
revenue only in 
one segment. 
Various business 
segments with a 
wide range of 
services in some of 
them. Diversified 
final market with 
low costumer 
concentration.  
OR   
Operates at least in 
4 or more product 
segments; no 
exposure for more 
than 45% of the 
revenue only in 
one segment. 
Several business 
segments with a 
wide range of 
services in at least 
one of them. 
Diversified final 
market with some 
costumer 
concentration.  
OR   
Operates at least in 
3 or more product 
segments; no 
exposure for more 
than 50% of the 
revenue only in 
one segment. 
Some business 
segments with a 
wide range of 
services in at least 






OR   
Operates at least in 
2 or more product 
segments; no 
exposure for more 
than 60% of the 




depend mainly on 
one of them. Low 
diversification in 
the end-market 
with high costumer 
concentration.  
Only one business 
segments. Very 
low diversification 
in the end-market 
with high customer 
concentration  
Only one business 
















 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca C D 






operations in 3 or 
more separate 
market; no 
exposure for more 
than 30% of the 







operations in 3 or 
more separate 
market; no 
exposure for more 
than 35% of the 








operations in 3 or 
more separate 
market; no 
exposure for more 
than 30% of the 







operations in 3 or 
more separate 
market; no 
exposure for more 
than 45% of the 








operations in 3 or 
more separate 
market; no 
exposure for more 
than 35% of the 







operations in 3 or 
more separate 
market; no 
exposure for more 
than 55% of the 








operations in 3 or 
more separate 
market; no 
exposure for more 
than 45% of the 








operations in 2 or 
more separate 
market; no 
exposure for more 
than 65% of the 








operations in 3 or 
more separate 
market; no 
exposure for more 
than 55% of the 







operations in 2 or 
more separate 
market; no 
exposure for more 
than 75% of the 









operations in 2 or 
more separate 
market; no 
exposure for more 
than 65% of the 







operations in 1 or 
more separate 
market; no 
exposure for more 
than 80% of the 








operations in 2 or 
more separate 
market; no 
exposure for more 
than 75% of the 




Very high sales 
concentration; 
maintain material 
operations in 1 or 
more separate 
market; exposure 
over 80% of the 













Appendix 9 – “Financial Profile” Scorecard Proposal 
 
 
 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca Caa Ca 
 
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Services and Branded Products Sector 
Debt / EBITDA < 0,6 < 1,2 < 2,1 < 3 < 4,3 < 6,2 < 8,5 < 10 < 12 ≥  12 
EBITDA / Interest Expenses > 20 > 15 > 10 > 6 > 3 > 2 > 1 > 0 ≤ 0 - 
CFO / Debt > 65% > 45% > 30% > 18% > 12% > 5% > 2,5% > 0 ≤ 0 - 
RCF / Net Debt > 78% > 52% > 40% > 25% > 15% > 8% > 5% > 2.5% ≤ 2.5% - 
EBITDA Margin > 30% > 25% > 20% > 15% > 10% > 7% > 4% > 1% ≤ 1% - 
Capital and Asset-Intensive Sector 
Debt / EBITDA < 0,6 < 1,3 < 2,2 < 3,3 < 4,5 < 6,2 < 8,4 < 10 < 12 ≥  12 
EBITDA / Interest Expenses > 35 > 21,5 > 12,5 > 7 > 3 > 1,5 > 0,7 > 0 ≤ 0 - 
FCF / Debt > 35% > 28% > 20% > 14% > 8% > 4% > 0% > -5% ≤ -5% - 
RCF / Net Debt > 65% > 48% > 35% > 20% > 12% > 6% > 2.5% > 0 ≤ 0 - 
EBITDA Margin > 45% > 32% > 25% > 18% > 14% > 10% > 7% > 3% ≤ 3% - 
Pure Commodity Sector 
Debt / EBITDA < 0,5 < 1,1 < 2 < 3 < 4 < 5,6 < 7,5 < 9 < 11 ≥  11 
EBITDA / Interest Expenses > 30 > 20 > 10 > 7 > 4 > 2.5 > 1 > 0 ≤ 0 - 
FCF / Debt > 40% > 30% > 24% > 18% > 12% > 7% > 3% > 0 ≤ 0 - 
RCF / Net Debt > 60% > 40% > 30% > 20% > 10% > 5% > 2% > 0 ≤ 0 - 
EBITDA Margin > 40% > 28% > 22% > 17% > 12% > 10% > 5% > 2.5% ≤ 2.5% - 
 
 125 
National Industries and Utilities 
Debt / EBITDA < 2 < 3.5 < 5 < 6.5 < 8 < 9 < 10.5 < 12 < 15 ≥  15 
EBITDA / Interest Expenses > 10 > 7 > 4.5 > 3 > 2 > 1 > 0 > -1 ≤ -1 - 
FCF / Debt > 20% > 15% > 12% > 9% > 5% > 2% > 0% > -5% ≤ -5% - 
RCF / Net Debt > 40% > 30% > 18% > 10% > 7% > 4% > 1.5% > 0 ≤ 0 - 






Appendix 10 – “Financial Policy” Scorecard Proposal 
 
 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca C R 
 




































the market with 
known track 
record (>5 years 


















the market with 
good track 
record (>3 years 


















the market with 
good track 
record (>3 years 



















the market with 
no track record 












































































































risk and very 
good capacity to 




profile over the 
long term. Very 
good ability to 






Almost no event 
risk and very 
good capacity to 
manage the risk 
Public 
commitment to 
a solid credit 
profile over the 
long term. Good 







event risk and 
good capacity to 
manage the risk 





could lead to a 
weaker credit 
profile. Modest 








risk and good 
capacity to 
manage the risk 





could lead to a 
troubled credit 
profile. Modest 









might cause a 
rating transition 
due to limited 
capacity to 

















might cause a 
rating transition 
due to limited 
capacity to 
















spurs event risk 
and limited 
capacity to react 















event risk and 
limited capacity 
to react to risk.  
Strong overhang 




of ability to 






equity mix most 
certainly leads 
event risk and 
limited capacity 
to react to risk.  
Excessive 




of ability to 






equity mix will 
trigger event 
risk and no 
capacity to react 
to risk.  









very strong and 
stable metrics. 


























































































































































liabilities can be 
expected not to 
convert into 


























































Z"-Score Conversion Table 
Lower Upper S&P Rating 
8,15 >8.15 AAA 
7,6 8,15 AA+ 
7 7,6 AA 
6,85 7 A+ 
6,4 6,85 A 
6,25 6,4 BBB+ 
5,65 6,25 BBB 
5,25 5,65 BB+ 
4,75 5,25 BB 
4,5 4,75 B+ 
3,75 4,5 B 
3,2 3,75 CCC+ 
1,75 3,2 CCC 
<1.75 1,75 D 











































from Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006, figure 12.1 
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